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ABSTRACT 
 
Any single health service organization today is likely engaged in dozens of 
concurrent, often times unrelated change initiatives. Each of these change initiatives is 
likely supported by evidence that demonstrates the innovation’s intended, first order 
impact. However, very little attention has been paid to the unintended, second order 
impacts of innovation. In this dissertation we introduce a model to provide a framework 
for inquiring about this very type of non-immediate impact. Next, using three 
innovations currently being implemented in the healthcare industry—training primary 
care residents to perform in-office colonoscopies, Studer Group’s ‘Evidence Based 
Leadership,’ and implementation of electronic health records in a hospital-integrated 
pediatric network—we model the innovations’ second order impacts within the context 
of our second order impact conceptual model.  Cost effectiveness analysis, multiple 
analysis of variance (MANOVA), and two-level fixed effects modeling are used to 
across the three interventions. Results from the primary care residency intervention 
support further investment in colorectal cancer screening training for primary care 
residents. Results from the Studer Group’s ‘Evidence Based Leadership’ intervention 
demonstrate mixed results across change interventions and across categories of tenure, 
suggesting receptivity towards change and organization tenure is highly dependent upon 
the nuances of a specific change intervention. Finally, results from the implementation 
of the electronic health record demonstrate improved charge capture. 
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We conclude that this further probing of popular innovations in the industry is 
warranted for multiple reasons. For one, it is entirely possible that social scientists and 
economists are prematurely ‘moving on’ to other innovations as soon they have 
published results from an initial round of inquiry. However, as we will demonstrate in 
our model, it is conceivable that after the “lights have dimmed” on an innovation’s initial 
glow, the artifacts of the innovation could very well continue to disrupt structures and 
processes long after its implementation. If these latent disruptions adversely affect the 
organization, one could argue that any initial positive impacts were likely overstated. 
Conversely, if these latent disruptions go on to produce additional benefit to the 
organization one could argue that any initial positive results were actually understated. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: EXPLORING SECOND ORDER IMPACTS OF INNOVATION 
 
Introduction 
The issue of uncertainty is a significant barrier in the adoption of innovation. It is 
known that change recipients are more likely to adopt an innovative process when 
uncertainty is mitigated (Rogers, 2010). Knowledge of an innovation’s impact is critical 
for ensuring its adoption, diffusion, and long-term sustainability. Empirically 
demonstrating the benefits of an innovation is the key driver behind the evidence-based 
management movement (Walshe & Rundall, 2001). While innovation research is a 
longstanding field—a 1943 study on hybrid corn farming serves as the field’s opus 
primus—an overwhelming majority of the research has focused on the immediate and 
beneficial impacts of innovation. By one account, only 26 out of 26,300 innovation 
articles covered the undesirable consequences of innovation (Sveiby, Gripenberg, 
Segercrantz, Eriksson, & Aminoff, 2009). This “pro-innovation bias” has been traced 
back to the core belief that “innovation is good”—a belief that is self-servingly hawked 
by innovation financiers, change agents, government leaders, and even innovation 
researchers themselves. As such, experts in the field have called for more rigorous, 
objective evaluation of the impacts of innovation by investigating “the broader context 
in which an innovation diffuses” (Rogers, 2010, p. 98). 
From the evidence-based management perspective, the strongest of innovations 
ought to be able to withstand not just the empirical prodding of their immediate, first 
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order impacts (a requisite for meeting the definition of “evidence-based”) but also their 
second order impacts, defined here as the indirect, unintended effects of an innovation. 
This dissertation aims to do just that. The goal of this study is to identify and explore the 
relationships between innovations in health care delivery and their second order impacts. 
Specifically, this study will investigate three current innovations in the healthcare 
industry. However, rather than focus only on their primary, first order impacts—
something that is already well-documented in social science and economic literature—
we will instead focus explicitly on the second order impacts of these innovations. Using 
a new bricolage conceptual model laid out here in Chapter 1, we will produce a 
taxonomy of second order impacts that will intertwine concepts from innovation 
diffusion theory and evidence-based management. Results from each of our three second 
order evaluations will either: 
A) reveal beneficial, unintended, and anticipated consequences—envisaged 
windfall—for the innovation that were not previously measured or even 
considered in its demonstrations of first order impact; 
B) reveal beneficial, unintended, and unanticipated consequences—naïve windfall—
for the innovation that were not previously measured or even considered in its 
demonstrations of first order impact; 
C) reveal non-beneficial, unintended, but anticipated consequences—sub-
optimality—that should be carefully monitored and, when possible, mitigated by 
change agents, or; 
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D) reveal non-beneficial, unintended, and unanticipated consequences—counter-
finality—that can now be considered in future implementations of the innovation. 
 
Why are Second Order Impacts Important? 
This is a timely study given the rapidly changing landscape of the US healthcare 
industry. Federal healthcare reform, an increasingly sick, aging population, and an 
evolving healthcare workforce has created an environment of continuous change for 
healthcare organizations. Both payers and patients are calling upon providers to improve 
the ways in which they deliver care while simultaneously reducing costs. As a result of 
these demands, any single health service organization today is likely engaged in dozens 
of concurrent, often times unrelated change initiatives (Bita A. Kash, Aaron Spaulding, 
Larry Gamm, & Christopher E. Johnson, 2013; A. Spaulding, Gamm, Kim, & Menser, 
2014). Each of these change initiatives is likely supported by evidence that demonstrates 
the innovation’s intended first order impact. Thus, electronic health records (the 
innovation) are being widely implemented to improve care coordination, error reduction, 
and clinical decision support (the first order impacts). Similarly, primary care physicians 
are now being trained to perform complex procedures, such as colonoscopy, in their own 
offices (the innovation) in order to improve patient access and adherence (the first order 
impact). Finally, cultural change initiatives such as Studer Group’s ‘Evidence Based 
Leadership’ (the innovation) are being widely adopted by acute care hospitals in an 
effort to improve patient satisfaction scores and organizational accountability (the first 
order impact). However, like most innovation research, little if any attention has been 
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paid to these three innovations’ second order impacts (Sveiby et al., 2009). The model 
we introduce in the following section provides a framework for inquiring about this very 
type of non-immediate impact. 
We contend that this further probing of popular innovations in the industry is 
warranted for multiple reasons. For one, it is entirely possible that social scientists and 
economists are prematurely ‘moving on’ to other innovations as soon they have 
published results from an initial round of inquiry. However, as we will demonstrate in 
our model, it is conceivable that after the “lights have dimmed” on an innovation’s initial 
glow, the artifacts of the innovation could very well continue to disrupt structures and 
processes long after its implementation. If these latent disruptions adversely affect the 
organization, one could argue that any initial positive impacts were likely overstated. 
Conversely, if these latent disruptions go on to produce additional benefit to the 
organization one could argue that any initial positive results were actually understated. 
Examples of the latter have been documented by Zahra and George (2002) who 
demonstrate how organizations can exploit an innovation to produce subsequent, 
dynamic organizational capability. 
Yet another justification for additional probing of popular innovations is to better 
understand why so many innovations fail to “catch on” among certain individuals, 
organizations, or the industry as a whole despite their positive first order impacts. A 
plausible hypothesis is that innovation designers and researchers get too caught up in the 
beneficial first order impacts and fail to account for the innovation’s unintended fallout 
on individuals or economics. Such oversight can result in the failed detection and 
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management of oppositional forces to the innovation. If these forces wield sufficient 
social, administrative, or financial capital, this otherwise positive innovation will likely 
end up discarded by the organization or the industry altogether as just another failed 
“flavor of the month”. 
Our final argument in favor of second order probing of popular innovations is to 
grow the knowledge base for each innovation. We began this chapter discussing how 
uncertainty is a significant barrier in the adoption of innovation. We argue that the more 
molecular our understanding for any single innovation, the more uncertainty we remove 
for change agents. Just as physicians are well-documented in their tenacity of asking, 
“Where’s the evidence?” (Guyatt et al., 1992), so too should change agents be skeptical 
as they go about identifying and selecting innovations. As Sveiby and colleagues (2009) 
demonstrated, it is often easy to find straightforward, positive associations between  an 
innovation and its first order impact. But astute managers and change agents must look 
beyond the here and now. In keeping with our physician metaphor, we do not consider it 
a triumph when: “The operation was wildly successful. Shame the patient died.” We 
contend that inquiry of second order impacts extends the evaluation horizon for each 
innovation and, as a result, keeps us from solely focusing on the operation and to instead 
be mindful of both the operation and the patient.  
 
Classification 
Rogers (2010) introduced three dichotomies for the consequences of innovation: 
desirable versus undesirable, direct versus indirect, and anticipated versus unanticipated. 
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The first dichotomy is rather simplistic. The desirability of an innovation’s outcome is 
determined at the outset by the change agent. It is important to specify perspective when 
discussing innovation. Only the change agent, whether that is an individual, group, or 
institution, serves as judge in determining whether or not an innovation’s impact is 
beneficial. For example, an innovation might very well result in detrimental first order 
impacts to people, processes, or the environment, yet still be viewed as ‘beneficial’ from 
the perspective of the change agent. As mentioned earlier, over 99 percent of all 
innovation studies have focused on desirable outcomes related to innovation. 
Rogers’ second dichotomy, directness, is determined by whether or not an 
innovation’s impact is causal and exclusive—a direct impact—or is instead the result of 
the “interplay between the action and the objective situation” and is not necessarily 
exclusive to the innovation—an indirect impact (Robert K. Merton, 1936, p. 895; Sveiby 
et al., 2009). Diffusion theory scholars amend this dichotomy with the concept of intent. 
They argue that knowing the intent of the change agent represents a more parsimonious 
measure for categorizing and understanding indirect consequences. For example, a 
manager might intend to improve workplace morale by offering a more comprehensive 
health insurance plan to employees. However, a number of intermediate cause-and-effect 
sequences must take place first before we would expect to see an impact on workplace 
morale (i.e., employees must first take advantage of the new health plan by seeking out 
preventive care, which would lead to fewer sick days, which would improve office 
efficiency, which might finally lead to a boost in office morale). Although the 
improvement in morale in this case fulfilled the original intent of the office manager, it 
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was rather indirect. Thus, for the purposes of this study we combine the two measures by 
defining our variable of interest—second order impact—as the unintended, indirect 
impact of an innovation. So, in the example above, we would not consider improved 
office morale to be a second order impact of the enhanced health plan as it was a 
fulfillment of the manager’s original intent. 
Rogers’ third dichotomy, anticipation, refers to the knowledge or awareness of a 
likely particular consequence by the change agent a priori. It is important to note here 
that an unintended consequence is distinctly different from an unanticipated 
consequence. The change agent establishes the intent of an innovation. That intent is 
either fulfilled or frustrated in the end. However, the means taken to realize that end can 
be either anticipated or unanticipated. For example, if the original intent of an innovation 
is fulfilled, that impact could have occurred via anticipated or unanticipated means. 
Baert (1991) provides the following illustration, albeit rather macabre: Person A intends 
to kill Person B by poison. On the way to Person B’s house to conduct said poisoning, 
Person A accidentally runs over Person B in their driveway, killing them instantly. In 
this case, the intent of murder was fulfilled, but the method was unanticipated. This 
example demonstrates that unanticipated consequences occur when, at the time of intent, 
the change agent is either: A) unaware of the possibility, or B) aware of the possibility 
but incorrect in their prediction. 
Using these three dichotomies, we now create a classification of second order 
impacts. Figure 1 illustrates the positioning of second order impacts in relation to the 
original innovation. The model begins by welcoming the evidence of first order impacts 
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provided by the extant body of research on any single innovation. In this brave new 
world of evidence-based management, we would expect most popular organizational 
innovations in healthcare to have been vetted by practitioners, clinical scientists, and (we 
can hope) social scientists alike. The results from these studies would place them in one 
of the first four categories of first order impact. One would assume that any innovation 
whose impact falls into either of the bottom two categories of undesirability would not 
be widely diffused and its shelf-life to be short-lived. However, as the model indicates 
these undesirable innovations possess second order impacts nonetheless; we simply are 
not interested in pursuing further research on an ill-fated innovation. 
Innovations whose primary impacts fall into the top two categories are, by 
definition, desirable. The only difference between the two is that initial research on an 
innovation can often demonstrate positive impacts, though the means by which the 
innovation attained its end were different from what was initially expected by the change 
agent. Edward Jenner’s initial discovery of the smallpox vaccine occurred unexpectedly 
by infecting a small child with cowpox (Meynell, 1995). This initial ‘evidence’ would 
have fallen into the second category of first order impacts: the outcome was desirable, 
the intent was fulfilled, but Jenner had not anticipated the means. We should note 
however, that after Jenner’s initial discovery and pronouncement, all subsequent 
research on cowpox as a smallpox prophylactic conducted by researchers who were 
aware of Jenner’s findings would fall into the first category of first order impacts since 
the effects of cowpox on smallpox were now known and anticipated. 
 
! ! !
9 
 
Figure 1: Second order impacts in relation to innovation. Adapted from Baert (1991), 
Rogers (2010), and Sveiby et al. (2009) 
 
As indicated in the shaded boxes, this study is principally interested in the top 
category of first order impacts—that is, innovations with impacts that are intended, 
anticipated, and desirable. As highlighted earlier, over 99.9 percent of innovation 
research has been conducted within this category (Sveiby et al., 2009). 
The second column in the model represents the focus of this study. This column 
answers the question, “What about the unintended, non-immediate impacts of these well-
studied, intended, anticipated, and desirable innovations?” To answer this question we 
continue with two of Rogers’ three dichotomies discussed earlier: desirability and 
anticipation. We now leave behind the dichotomy of intent as we are now only interested 
in impacts that were unintended at the time of innovation selection. Any outcomes that 
! ! !
10 
result from an innovation that were part of the original intent, by definition, are first 
order impacts. 
Second order impacts are classified as being either desirable or undesirable. We 
further bifurcate this classification by contending that an outcome’s desirability (or 
undesirability) can be either anticipated or unanticipated. We begin from the bottom of 
the four categories of second order impacts (see Figure 1). An innovation that initially 
produces intended, desirable, and anticipated impact can also result in unintended 
impacts that are undesirable and are unanticipated. In sociological literature this second 
order impact is referred to as counter-finality (Sartre, 2004). Examples of counter-
finality abound in healthcare. The overuse of antibiotics provides a fine example. Social 
pressure from parents has been shown to induce primary care physicians into recklessly 
prescribing antibiotics for children with nonspecific upper respiratory tract infections 
(Barden, Dowell, Schwartz, & Lackey, 1998). We now know that this practice has led to 
the development of antibiotic-resistant pneumococci. However, at least for the 
prescribing physicians who were unaware of this possibility, the end result—patients 
with antibiotic-resistant pneumococci—was unintended, undesirable, and unanticipated. 
The original intent of having a healthy patient was countered by the physician’s own 
actions. 
Moving up to the next category of second order impacts, we find unintended 
impacts that are undesirable but were anticipated by the change agent. In sociological 
literature this second order impact is referred to as sub-optimality. Going back to our 
antibiotic example, not all of the physicians who recklessly prescribed were unaware of 
! ! !
11 
the implications for over-prescribing antibiotics. However, these physicians wrote 
prescriptions nonetheless. (Perhaps the physician was fearful of receiving a bad online 
review from an angry parent who just paid a $45 copay to be told their child only needs 
rest and hydration. After all, the rival physicians across the street would undoubtedly 
offer the prescription just to pacify the parent and capture a new patient.) The outcome 
for this case is sub-optimal: an action is carried out by the physician knowing that said 
action will likely have an unintended and undesirable consequence, but goes through 
with the prescription regardless. 
Continuing upwards in the column, we find unintended impacts that are desirable 
but were not anticipated by the change agent. We term this category of second order 
impacts “naïve windfall” as the change agent was unaware of the possibility of this 
impact, but benefits from it nonetheless. The discovery of quinine—the anti-malarial 
drug that has now been used for centuries—is a health-related example of naïve 
windfall. A South American Indian infected with malaria was suffering from one of the 
disease’s common symptoms—unbearable thirst. Unable to walk to his typical source of 
drinking water, the Indian drank from a puddle of bitter water at the base of a cinchona 
tree (at that time the only known use of cinchona by the natives was as a poison). After 
the Indian’s fever abated, natives began harvesting cinchona and later introduced the 
medicine to Jesuit missionaries in 1630 (Achan et al., 2011). Though the original intent 
of the Indian was simply to quench his malaria-induced thirst, he unexpectedly also 
discovered the cure to his disease. 
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We have now arrived at the fourth and final category of second order impacts—
those that are desirable and could have been anticipated by the change agent. We term 
this category of second order impacts “envisaged windfall” as the change agent was 
aware of the possibility of this desirable impact, but it was not a part of the original 
intent. If a hospital were to successfully treat a sick, but very wealthy patient and later 
acquire a large charitable donation from that same patient, no hospital foundation leader 
would ever claim fulfillment of original intent. The charitable donation in this case 
would be an envisaged windfall. The physicians and nurses healed the patient; fulfilling 
the hospital’s intent. However, a hospital foundation leader could anticipate that a 
wealthy patient who receives exceptional service during their stay might also donate 
funds for a new hospital wing. 
We now transition away from the taxonomy component of the model and 
introduce the horizontally oriented diffusion/adoption axis and the vertically oriented 
“E”vidence-based management axis. (We use the terms “diffusion” and “adoption” 
synchronously here as the model can be applied at the individual level—beckoning the 
term “adoption”—or at the organizational level—beckoning the term “diffusion”. Thus, 
we concur with Rogers (2010) and other innovation scholars that the adoption of an 
innovation at the individual level is nested in that same innovation’s subsequent 
diffusion across groups, organizations, networks, and society (Kamakura & 
Balasubramanian, 1988; Robertson & Gatignon, 1986; Valente, 1993).) The basis for the 
diffusion/adoption axis is built upon Rogers’ (2010) diffusion moderator—
observability—and the concept of innovation latency. Observability denotes the ease in 
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which an innovation’s impact is observed or felt by change agents and change recipients. 
An innovation with higher observability will diffuse more quickly through a network 
than an otherwise identical innovation with lower observability (Rogers, 2010). 
Meanwhile, latency denotes the amount of time required for an innovation to yield an 
observable impact. An innovation with lower latency will diffuse more quickly through a 
network than an otherwise identical innovation with higher latency (Hivner, Hopkins, & 
Hopkins, 2003). 
Innovations in maternal health promotion provide a robust example of these two 
moderating factors at work. Maternal health innovations typically involve low 
observability as a result of the opacity of the relationship between maternal nutrition and 
fetal development. Aside from ultrasound, which is infrequent in developed countries 
and rarely accessible (if at all) in developing countries, mothers are not able to directly 
observe fetal development. As a result, health promoters must aggressively promote 
maternal health innovations through abstract educational processes about the importance 
of nutrition and other environmental factors on fetal development. This process requires 
significant financial and human capital that, in turn, impedes the adoption and diffusion 
of the innovation. 
Similarly, maternal health innovations suffer from an extended latency relative to 
other health innovations. For example, a mother might wait up to ninth months to 
observe any birthing-related impacts stemming from a maternal health innovation, such 
as with docosahexaenoic acid supplementation during pregnancy and increased birth size 
(Ramakrishnan et al., 2010)). This latency is even higher when we consider maternal 
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health innovations that target cognitive and physical health improvements in term infants 
and children, such as with docosahexaenoic acid supplementation during pregnancy and 
augmented IQ in children at four years of age (Helland, Smith, Saarem, Saugstad, & 
Drevon, 2003). With these two moderators combined it would be expected for 
innovations in maternal development, particularly in developing countries, to diffuse 
slower than other health-related innovations. For example, a sanitation or water 
purification project would exhibit higher observability (i.e., change recipients can 
physically see improved sanitary conditions in their schools, houses, or water supply) 
and lower latency (i.e., change recipients experience lower incidence rates of 
gastrointestinal disease within days of the intervention). 
With these definitions in place, we contend that second order impacts of 
innovation typically exhibit lower observability, higher latency, or a combination of both 
when compared to their first order brethren. Lower observability here can emerge as a 
result of the innovation affecting an audience or object separate from the intended group 
of change recipients and thus, be less visible to the change agent(s). This can be the 
result from “tunnel vision” (where the change agents are only focused on the 
innovation’s intended, immediate impacts), outright naiveté (where the change agent is 
simply unaware of second order impacts) or neglect (where the change agents are aware 
of second order impacts, but does consider them to be of significant concern). Second 
order impacts can also suffer from relatively lower observability due to basic attenuation 
in the innovation’s impact as it is diffused across an organization or society. For 
example, innovations in the technology industry are typically met with fanfare from the 
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media and public alike as early adopters and early majority adopters accept the 
innovation into their lives. However, less attention is paid to that same innovation later 
as the late majority and the laggards eventually adopt the technology. Although second 
order impacts do not always exhibit low observability, we would expect them to often 
exhibit lower observability than first order impacts given that a change agent had not 
intended them and, conceivably, was not looking for them.  
Meanwhile, higher latency is typically associated with second order impacts as a 
result of the innovation’s first order impacts needing to be absorbed first by an 
organization before subsequent behaviors and institutional changes begin to emerge in 
response to the initial innovation. Referring to our earlier discussion of the discovery of 
quinine, the unintended, unanticipated impact of the cinchona tree only occurred after 
the intended impact—the quenching of thirst—had been realized. Although second order 
impacts do not always exhibit high latency, we would expect them to often exhibit 
higher latency than first order impacts given the probable sequencing of an innovation’s 
cause-and-effect relationship. 
Using these two characteristics of second order impacts—observability and 
latency—we contend that second order impacts of an innovation contribute to the 
adoption or rejection of the innovation, albeit with relatively less influence than first 
order impacts. This component of the model allows us to connect back to the four 
categories of second order impact. When a second order impact of an innovation is 
detected and falls into the category of envisaged windfall, this outcome serves as 
positive feedback to the innovation’s diffusion and supplements the positive feedback 
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already being generated from its beneficial first order impact. Similarly, when a second 
order impact is detected and classified as naïve windfall, this also serves as positive, 
supplemental feedback to the innovation’s continued adoption diffusion. Recall that the 
power of the feedback being provided by second order impacts here is of a lesser 
magnitude than the power of feedback from first order impacts. The degree of loss here 
is a function of the second order impact’s observability and latency. Second order 
impacts with high observability and low latency would wield stronger supplemental 
feedback than second order impacts with low observability and high latency. Regardless, 
as long as a second order impact falls into one of these first two categories of 
desirability, support for the innovation’s diffusion will be augmented. 
Conversely, when a second order impact is detected and falls into one of the 
undesirable categories—sub-optimality or counter-finality—the impact serves as 
negative feedback to the innovation’s diffusion and counteracts the positive feedback 
being generated from its desirable first order impact. The power of the second order 
impact here is very important. As discussed above, second order impacts with high 
observability and low latency possess more power to affect the innovation’s diffusion. 
One can imagine instances where a second order impact with high observability and low 
latency could potentially disrupt and even terminate the diffusion of an innovation, in 
spite of the innovation’s acclaimed first order impacts. A public health example of this 
counteraction is common with oral contraception use in developing countries, where the 
first order impact—effective family planning and reduced adolescent pregnancy—is 
counteracted by a second order impact—an increased fear by male partners and parents 
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that this contraceptive method would promote promiscuity (Konje & Ladipo, 1999; 
Schoen, 2005). Alternately, if the second order impact is undesirable but exhibits low 
power (from low observability, high latency, or a combination of both), we would expect 
for it to produce negative feedback for the innovation’s diffusion, but not enough to 
necessarily supersede the positive feedback from its desirable first order impact. In these 
cases, the second order impact will not reverse the innovation’s diffusion, but may serve 
to diminish its rate of diffusion. An example of this undesirable-but-low-power second 
order impact can be illustrated again through our earlier example of poor antibiotic 
stewardship. Here the physician is aware of the undesirable second order impact, but that 
impact is not strong enough to counteract the physician’s behavior. Specifically, the 
positive feedback produced from retaining the patient (a desirable first order impact) is 
greater than the negative feedback produced by contributing to the population’s 
development antibiotic-resistant diseases (an undesirable second order impact). Perhaps 
not surprisingly, this undesirable second order impact exhibits both characteristics for an 
undesirable-but-low-power second order impact: low observability (not many patients 
will necessarily contract antibiotic-resistant pneumococci compared to other infectious 
diseases) and high latency (it might be years or decades (if ever) before the reckless 
physician’s patient contracts antibiotic-resistant pneumococci). 
The overuse of antibiotics example also provides us with a good illustration of 
the fluidity of the affect power of second order impacts. For example, if one were to 
improve the observability and reduce the latency of a second order impact, the 
subsequent increase in affect power could eventually reach a tipping point where the 
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second order impact would counteract positive feedback from a first order impact. Public 
health experts and policymakers have begun efforts to increase the observability of 
antibiotic-resistant diseases through public awareness campaigns (Isaacs & Andresen, 
2013), educational interventions (Paphitou, 2013), stricter laws for the dispensing of 
antibiotics (Fox, 2011), and improved clinical decision support systems (Rattinger et al., 
2012). In the same vein, recent increases in the pervasiveness of antibiotic resistance 
(English & Gaur, 2010) is decreasing the latency for this undesirable second order 
impact. Although bad for society, this lower latency should increase the affect power of 
this undesirable second order impact. Given this combination of improved observability 
and lower latency, as our model would predict, we should perhaps not be surprised that 
we are beginning to see improvements in physicians’ prescribing behaviors (Davey et 
al., 2013). 
Finally, we transition to the last component of our model—the vertically oriented 
evidence-based management axis. Here we adopt Rousseau’s (2006) sliding scale for 
evaluating, scrutinizing, and ranking evidence-based management practices. Rousseau’s 
conceptual model argues that all business practices in an organization fall somewhere on 
a spectrum of social scientific scrutiny. At the low end of the spectrum, business 
practices are based on “little e evidence”—that is, subjective, unsystematic, anecdotal 
data. “We’re doing it this way because we have always done it this way” is a classic, 
commonplace example and defense of “little e evidence.” Still another example that 
could be overheard in almost any US hospital is “We’re doing it this way because this is 
how they do it at (insert revered hospital name here).” To be clear, there is nothing 
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inherently wrong with this category of business practices. Acting on anecdotal data is 
often times more prudent than acting on no data at all. In the right context, many of these 
“little e” business practices can be quite successful (Halm, 2009). Institutional theory 
predicts that mimicry alone helps in establishing and demonstrating the legitimacy of an 
organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Therefore managers might conclude that 
replicating an increasingly mainstream business practice is a safe bet, even if it has not 
been vetted by peer-reviewed research. However, these business practices often end up 
not being sustained by an organization and are commonly (and aptly) referred to as 
managerial “flavors of the month” (Beer, 2003; Gilbert & Ivancevich, 2000). Such 
business practices are frequently the byproducts of localized sensemaking versus careful 
reflection of established cause-and-effect relationships (Rousseau, 2006). Subsequently, 
when any of these business practices begin to erode or fall short of expectations, change 
agents are unable to identify or address the sources of the issue. Thus, with 
bewilderment the change agent responds, “It worked before,” or “It works elsewhere.” 
This uncertainty then leads to either a premature abandonment of the business practice—
a managerial Type II error of sorts—or a ‘doubling down’ on an inherently flawed 
approach—a managerial Type I error. 
“Big E evidence,” on the other hand, would be a business practice that was built 
on social science knowledge where cause-and-effect linkages were known by the change 
agent a priori and were being exploited to fulfill original intent. The emphasis on social 
science knowledge here is not just a shameless plug for the field. Instead it is to highlight 
one of the field’s strong suits—our ability to isolate variations that measurably affect 
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desired outcomes (Rousseau, 2006). Without this ability, it is nearly impossible to know 
if a specific business practice works because of its content or merely because of the 
situational context in which it was implemented. This ability to separate chaff from seed 
is how social scientists have identified “Big E Evidence”-based practices such as goal 
setting (Locke & Latham, 1990), simplification heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), feedback and redesign autonomy (Goodman, 2000) 
and stakeholder participation (Freeman, 2010), just to name a few. Use of these “Big E 
Evidence”-based business practices have been linked with more satisfied stockholders, 
employees, and customers (Goodman & Rousseau, 2004; Rucci, Kirn, & Quinn, 1998) 
and ensure more consistent attainment of organizational goals (Rousseau, 2006).  
In order to incorporate Rousseau’s evidence-based management component into 
our innovation-centric model, we will exchange Rousseau’s use of the term “business 
practice” for “innovation.”  We contend that this change does not disrupt any of the key 
arguments behind her conceptual model since our definition of “innovation” only 
pertains to management practices that are novel to an organization or industry (Pierce & 
Delbecq, 1977) whereas Rousseau’s focus on “business practice” includes both new and 
existing practices. 
The logic behind our scale is that change agents’ decisions to implement an 
innovation are often made using local, anecdotal data, if any data at all. Similar to what 
we have already discussed, these decisions can be the result of habit (e.g., to improve 
efficiency one must downsize), blindly following the latest “flavor of the month” 
business strategy, or relying on historical logic unique to the organization (i.e., flexible 
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scheduling did not work for the organization in the past, so it certainly would not work 
now either). We contend that second order impact research can fill this void of evidence-
less based management practices and provide meaningful, actionable solutions to change 
agents. Again, we are not attempting to debase the majority of first order impact 
research. To be clear, second order impact research is highly dependent on such 
research. Rather, research on second order impacts offers to broaden the spectrum of 
knowledge for any particular innovation. Thus, an innovation that has withstood the 
rigorous inquiry of both first and second order impacts would meet an even higher 
criteria of Rousseau’s (2006) “Big E Evidence”. 
Finally, we contend that the horizontal diffusion/adoption axis and the vertical 
“E”vidence based management axis are interrelated; that one can inform the other, and 
vice-versa. This occurs through second order impact research by reducing managerial 
myopia, whether it is for good or bad. When we identify desirable second order impacts, 
we accelerate diffusion by reducing uncertainty and enabling change agents to visualize 
additional returns on their investment (envisaged windfall). This finding elevates a 
business practice on the “E”vidence based management axis while increasing the power 
driving its further adoption and innovation. In a sense, discovering cases of envisaged or 
naïve windfall moves the innovation upwards and to left. 
Conversely, when we identify undesirable second order impacts, we prompt 
change agents to calculate a more accurate benefit-to-cost ratio and enable them to create 
strategies to address the now-expected sub-optimality or counter finality. This finding 
could degrade a business practice on the “E”vidence based management axis and slow 
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its adoption and diffusion. However as discussed earlier, not all undesirable second order 
impacts spell doom for an innovation. In many cases first order benefits clearly trump 
any second order penalty. However, knowledge of undesirable second order impacts can 
still serve as valuable input for change agents. An investigation into the undesirability 
can provide logical meaning for why the innovation had not diffused as quickly as 
change agents might have expected. Should they choose to proceed anyway (sub-
optimality) they are at least aware of adverse second order impacts and can attempt to 
mitigate them. 
 
Application of the Second Order Impact Model 
Using this conceptual model, we now transition to three specific change 
interventions that are currently being implemented in the healthcare industry. By 
choosing three interventions whose first order impacts are already well documented in 
the literature, we will provide three examples of how our conceptual model extends the 
evidence base for each respective intervention, by evaluating and categorizing their 
second order impacts. Should the findings yield envisaged windfall or naïve windfall, we 
will provide further support for their dissemination and improve their establishment as 
an evidence-based management practice. Conversely, should the findings yield sub-
optimality or counter-finality, researchers and managers alike should: A) be more 
cautious of these interventions; B) better understand why the innovation is perhaps not 
diffusing as quickly as they might have initially suspected; and C) seek to mitigate these 
negative second order impacts. 
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Paper 1: Colorectal Cancer Screening in Family Medicine Residency 
Purpose: To evaluate the clinical and economic implications of training primary 
care physicians via family medicine residency programs to offer colorectal cancer 
screening services as an in-office procedure. 
Methods: Using previously established clinical and economic assumptions from 
existing literature and budget data from a local grant, we calculated incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios (ICERs) that incorporate the costs of a national training program and 
subsequent improvements in patient compliance. Sensitivity analyses were also 
conducted. 
Results: Despite high costs associated with the national training program, ICERs 
remain well below standard willingness-to-pay thresholds under base case assumptions. 
Interestingly, the status quo hierarchy of preferred screening strategies is disrupted by 
the policy intervention. 
Conclusion: A national overhaul of family medicine residency programs offering 
training for colorectal cancer screening yields satisfactory ICERs. However, the model 
places high expectations on PCPs to improve current compliance levels in the US. With 
regards to our conceptual model, these results fall into the category of naïve windfall. 
Although these second order impacts are desirable, we contend they exhibit low to 
intermediate affect power. 
 
 
! ! !
24 
Paper 2: Organization Tenure and Nurses’ Perceptions of Change 
Purpose: To evaluate the relationship between a nurse’s organization tenure and 
their perceptions towards three different change interventions, each with varying levels 
of disruption to existing work processes. 
Methods: An electronic survey was administered to approximately 1,600 
medical-surgery nurses from a large, multi-hospital health system. Nurses were 
categorized into three categories of organization tenure: less than one year in the 
organization; between one and five years of experience in the organization; and more 
than five years in the organization. Confirmatory factor analysis was performed to 
confirm the presence of three factors: impact on patient care; impact on unit work 
change, and impact on individual job change. Nurses were asked the same questions for 
three different interventions: AIDET, hourly rounding, and discharge phone calls. A 
MANOVA was first performed for each of the three interventions to protect against 
inflating the Type 1 error rate in the follow-up ANOVAs (Cramer & Bock, 1966). 
Having satisfied significance thresholds with MANOVA, individual differences among 
tenure categories were subsequently examined using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
post hoc tests (Scheffe’s method).   
Results: Statistically significant MANOVAs were only found for two of the three 
interventions (AIDET and hourly rounding). ANOVAs revealed similar perceptions 
trends across all three subscales and all three categories of tenure. 
Discussion: In at least some cases, significant differences in perceptions do exist 
depending on how long you have been in an organization. Looking across the three 
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interventions it does not appear that the senior-most nurses categorically think less of the 
interventions than their junior counterparts. Instead, the mechanics and perceived 
disruptiveness of each individual intervention moderates nurse perceptions. With regards 
to our conceptual model, these results fall into two different categories. For nurses who 
are new to an organization (or for administrators looking to push out nurses who have 
been with the organization for more than 5 years) these results fall into the category of 
envisaged windfall. For nurse who are not new to an organization (or for administrators 
looking to retain nurses who have been with the organization for more than five years) 
these results fall into the category of sub-optimality. We argue these results exhibit 
potentially high affect power when viewed from the perspective of veteran nurses and 
the long-term sustainability of these three interventions. 
 
Paper 3: Electronic Health Records’ Impact on Charges and Collections  
Purpose: To measure the impact of implementing an electronic health record on 
providers’ charges and collections. 
Methods: We analyzed financial data from a large, metropolitan integrated 
primary care pediatric (PCP) network comprised of 372 providers across 42 practices. 
This PCP network implemented EPIC electronic health record system in the fall of 2010. 
Specifically, the 42 practices were divided into four groups, each of which had ‘go-live’ 
dates spread across August, September, and November of 2010. Monthly encounter, 
charge, and collection data were collected from October of 2008 through September of 
2013 for each provider. This range provided us with approximately two years of pre-
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implementation data and three years of post-implementation data, depending on a 
practice’s go-live date. We used a multi-level fixed-effect least squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) regression model, which controls for both payer mix level- and year-specific 
effects, to estimate the impact of an EHR implementation on a provider’s mean per 
patient charge, collection, and charge-to-collection ratio. Model selection between 
random effect and fixed effects was based on the Hausman test. The dependent variables 
were monthly provider-level charges per patient, collections per patient, and the charge-
to-collection ratio per patient. 
Results: EHRs increase per-patient charges by $17 (p < .01) and per-patient 
collections by $11 (p < .01).  A minor decrease (-0.00941) in the charge-to-collection 
ratio was found, but was not significant (p = .558). 
Discussion: Although the verdict is still out on EHRs’ impact on care 
coordination (i.e., reduction in medical errors, newfound communication among and 
within health service organizations, improvement in disease management, etc.), our 
results demonstrate that EHRs are successful in increasing an organization’s charges and 
collections.  The big question generated from this study is: Are EHRs enabling providers 
to deliver higher quality care that is resulting in the $17 increase in charges? Or, is the 
EHR merely improving providers’ charting processes that subsequently allow their 
organizations to increase charges by $17? With regards to our conceptual model, these 
results possibly fall into two different categories. From the organization’s perspective, 
these results fall into the category of envisaged windfall. From the perspective of society 
(that is, patients and payers) these results fall into the category of sub-optimality. We 
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argue these results exhibit potentially high affect power when viewed from the 
perspective of society. 
 
Conclusion 
We now proceed with the three independent investigations of second order 
impacts. In Chapter 5 we will revisit the second-order impacts conceptual model in light 
of insights gained from the studies introduced here. In addition to exploring their relative 
classifications within the second order impact conceptual framework, we will also 
address how each of the studies contribute to the original innovation’s standing as an 
evidence based business practice. We will also describe how the results ought to impact 
the innovation’s subsequent adoption and diffusion. Finally, we will briefly address 
some of the broader implications of these innovation studies and how our model can be 
applied to advance healthcare transformation.
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CHAPTER II 
EXPANDING NATIONAL CAPACITY FOR COLORECTAL CANCER 
SCREENING VIA FAMILY MEDICINE RESIDENCY PROGRAMS: EXPLORING 
CLINICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
 
Introduction 
Over 45 percent of US adults aged 50 to 75 are not up-to-date with colorectal 
cancer screening (Klabunde et al., 2011). This percentage is even higher among 
Hispanics and people lower on the socioeconomic scale (Klabunde et al., 2011). This is 
puzzling and frustrating to experts in colorectal cancer (CRC) prevention as the disease 
continues to be the second leading cause of cancer-related deaths in the US (Klabunde et 
al., 2011) despite its high survivability when detected early: 93.2 percent survival when 
discovered  at Dukes stage A and 77 percent survival at Dukes stage B (National Cancer 
Intelligence Unit (NCIN), 2009). While policy-makers push to increase the demand for 
colonoscopies through awareness campaigns (Lupkin, 2013), increased Medicare 
reimbursement rates (Gross et al., 2006), and CRC research funding (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2013), less attention has been given to the supply side of CRC 
screening; that is, the availability of well-trained, certified endoscopists. 
Demand for a wide array of CRC screening strategies continues to outpace 
supply (S Vijan, Inadomi, Hayward, Hofer, & Fendrick, 2004). Even the less-intrusive 
flexible sigmoidoscopy (FS), which does not require sedation and is more likely than 
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colonoscopy to be performed by a non-subspecialist, is not meeting demand (Wallace et 
al., 1999). Vijan et al estimated that between 1,360 to 32,700 additional 
gastroenterologists would be needed to meet demand for a wide array of CRC screening 
strategies (S Vijan et al., 2004). To reduce this deficit, a number of solutions have been 
proposed including: allowing advanced practice nurses to conduct FS, creating screening 
centers where one expert gastroenterologist supervises a number of endoscopists, and 
directing more research funding towards improving the accuracy of CT Colonography. 
Yet another strategy, and the focus of this analysis, is to dramatically increase the 
number of primary care physicians (PCP) who are trained and supportive of performing 
office-based colonoscopies or FS. A handful of arguments can be made for this strategy. 
First, office-based colonoscopies have been associated to higher patient compliance than 
when performed by a subspecialist (Rogge et al., 1994). Other research has determined 
that trust and frequent reminders, something more likely to be established between 
patients and their PCP, are two of the most important factors in promoting CRC 
screening compliance (O'Malley, Beaton, Yabroff, Abramson, & Mandelblatt, 2004; 
Erin G Stone et al., 2002). Additionally, access issues related to CRC screening, 
specifically the dearth of gastroenterologists in rural areas, could be reduced more 
efficiently through the use of existing PCP networks and infrastructure. Finally, 
colonoscopies performed by PCPs have been demonstrated to be as safe and effective as 
those performed by specialists (Wilkins et al., 2009). 
With such a strong case then for increasing the number of PCPs who are trained 
and supportive of performing office-based colonoscopies or FS, one might look to 
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family medicine residency (FMR) programs as an ideal training ground. However, in a 
recent study, Wilkins and colleagues (2004a) discovered that that fewer than 50 percent 
of US FMR programs offer any colonoscopy training. Even more alarming, the survey 
revealed that fewer than 20 percent of FMR programs had trained at least one resident to 
do colonoscopies in the previous year. This dearth of training opportunities for family 
medicine residents is likely to be directly related to the current deficit of certified 
endoscopists. 
In order to address this shortage of FMR training programs though, significant 
funding would need to be directed towards increasing the number of FMR programs that 
offer colonoscopy and FS training. However, creating and improving these training 
programs would be costly. FMR programs that do not already offer this training face 
high initial fixed costs (i.e., scopes, scope washers, endoscopy simulator, etc.). Wilkins 
and colleagues (2004b) found that nearly three-quarters of FMR programs rely on 
gastroenterologists (versus family physicians) to train residents, which results in higher 
variable costs as well. Given these high costs, if policy-makers were to pursue this 
strategy of developing FMR-based endoscopy training, these high training costs could 
disrupt the current cost-effectiveness data for various colorectal cancer screening 
strategies. For example, Vijan et al (2001) demonstrated in their multivariate sensitivity 
analysis how altering the cost of colonoscopy could result in colonoscopy losing its 
preferred strategy status. We argue that incorporating the costs of such an expansive 
training overhaul into the existing incremental cost effectiveness ratios for multiple 
colorectal cancer screening strategies is therefore warranted. 
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Figure 2: Markov decision model 
 
Methods 
Our model (see Figure 2) builds upon previously established assumptions from 
the Vijan et al (2001) model, which incorporates seven total CRC screening strategies, 
age-specific incidence of polyps, dwell time, CRC mortality rates, and direct medical 
costs. Using these assumptions as a foundation, we incorporated various fixed and 
variable training costs from both clinical literature and data from a CRC screening grant 
at the authors’ home institution. Furthermore, we used Vijan et al’s (2001) sensitivity 
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analysis of patient compliance as a proxy assumption for our central argument that 
patient compliance improves when CRC screening is administered as a PCP-conducted, 
in-office procedure. See Table 1 for a complete list of model assumptions. 
We estimated the costs of the training program by using the costs incurred by a 
single-site FMR program who recently introduced a drastic overhaul of its endoscopy 
training program. This particular FMR had offered endoscopy training prior to the grant, 
but would have fallen into Wilkins et al’s (2004a) category of programs that officially 
offer colonoscopy training, but rarely train one or more residents (30 percent of FMR 
programs nationally). Purchases related to this training overhaul included an exam 
gurney, endoscopy simulator, endoscopy processor, argon plasma coagulator and jet 
wash pump. We contend that because this FMR program’s training costs were to 
improve endoscopy training, versus introduce one, that these costs are conservative. The 
Wilkins et al’s (2004a) study identified that 52 percent of all FMR programs offer no 
colonoscopy training at all. We also included variable costs of clinical faculty time using 
both grant data and training requirements as set by the American Society for 
Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE): 75 and 30 supervised training hours for 
colonoscopy and flexible sigmoidoscopy, respectively (American Society for 
Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, 1998). 
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Table 1: Model assumptions 
Base%Case Range%Used%in%
Sensitivity%Analysis
References
Natural%history
Proportion(of(cancers(arising(from(polyps 75% ~
Prevalence%of%adenomatous%polyps
Age(50(years 20% ~
Age(60(years 40% ~
Age(70(years 50% ~
Age(80(years 55% ~
In%patients%with%polyps
Proportion(of(polyps(>1(cm 15% ~
Proportion(with(multiple(polyps 35% ~
Annual%incidence%of%colorectal%cancer
Age(50(years 0.05% ~
Age(55(years 0.09% ~
Age(60(years 0.14% ~
Age(65(years 0.20% ~
Age(70(years 0.27% ~
Age(75(years 0.35% ~
Age(80(years 0.43% ~
Age(85(years 0.45% ~
5@Year%colorectal%cancer%mortality
Localized 10.50% ~
Regional 35.10% ~
Disseminated 91.70% ~
Test%characteristics
Sensitivity(of(fecal(occult(blood(testing(for(polyps 5% ~
Specificity(of(fecal(occult(blood(testing 97.50% ~
Sensitivity%of%fecal%occult%blood%testing%for%cancer
Localized 30% ~
Regional 50% ~
Polyps(or(cancer(reachable(by(flexible(sigmoidoscopy 55% ~
Sensitivity(of(colonoscopy(or(flexible(sigmoidoscopy(for(polyps 85% ~
Sensitivity(of(colonoscopy(or(flexible(sigmoidoscopy(for(cancer 95% ~
Perforation(rate<comma>(colonoscopy 0.10% ~
Mortality(rate<comma>(perforation 7.50% ~
Costs
Fecal(occult(blood(testing $17 ~
Flexible(sigmoidoscopy $225 ~
Flexible(sigmoidoscopy(with(biopsy $240 ~
Colonoscopy $550 ~
Polypectomy((including(pathology) $215 ~
Cancer%care
Localized 60000 ~
Regional 82800 ~
Disseminated 73000 ~
Treating(colon(perforation 20000 ~
New%Program%Material%Costs
Exam(Guerney $3,500 ~ Grant(Data
Endoscopy(Simulator $85,000 ~ Grant(Data
Endoscopy(Processor $64,000 ~ Grant(Data
Argon(Plasma(Coagulator $20,000 ~ Grant(Data
Jet(Wash(Pump $7,000 ~ Grant(Data
Insurance,(maintenance,(service $0 ~ Grant(Data
Total $179,500 $134,625([(
$224,375
New%Program%Training%Costs
Clinical(Faculty(Cost(/(hr $120 $90([($150 Grant(Data
Facutly(hours(spent(with(COLO(residents((x(.5) 75 ~ ASGE,(1998
Facutly(hours(spent(with(FS(residents((x(.5) 30 ~ ASGE,(1999
New%Program%Output
Residents(trained((10(years) 63 47([(79 Grant(Data
Total(number(of(expanded(programs 38 29([(48 Wilkins(et(al.,(2004
%(new(physicians(who(actually(conduct(colonoscopy/fs(in(practice 50% 37.5%([(62.5% Grant(Data
Patient%Compliance
Status(quo 50% ~ Vijan(et(al.,(2001
Vijan(et(al.,(2001
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Baseline estimates of the number of residents who participate in a single training 
program annually (nine), as well as the percentage of residents who go on to practice 
colonoscopies or FS post-residency (50 percent), were based on anecdotal feedback from 
clinical faculty and residents at the grant-sponsored FMR program. We estimate that 
among the 50 percent of trained residents who go on to perform colonoscopy or FS in 
their practice, that each would complete 60 colonoscopy or 100 FS procedures annually 
based on evidence from other studies of recently trained PCPs (T. Walker, Deutchman, 
Ingram, Walker, & Westfall, 2012; Wilkins, Gillies, Jester, & Kenrick, 2005). Finally, 
we set a baseline estimate of 38 new training programs to be implemented across the US. 
This figure would double the number of programs that currently train residents in 
colonoscopy at ASGE-recommended levels (Wilkins et al., 2004a). 
We simulated the improved compliance rates by interpolating estimates created 
by Vijan et al (2001) in their sensitivity analysis (see Figure 3). Whereas Vijan et al 
(2001) assumed a 100 percent compliance rate, it is known that compliance in the US is 
much closer to 50 percent (Klabunde et al., 2011). We contend that an influx of PCPs 
who are trained and supportive of in-office colonoscopy or FS would result in a higher 
compliance rate. This assumption is supported by a number of studies which have 
demonstrated that PCP-conducted, in-office screening is a safe, effective, and often more 
convenient delivery method (O'Malley et al., 2004; Rogge et al., 1994; Erin G Stone et 
al., 2002; Wilkins et al., 2009). Thus, the baseline estimate in our model is set at 50 
percent compliance for the status quo and 75 percent compliance with the intervention. 
We argue that this is a modest baseline estimate as a 75 percent compliance rate was 
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obtained in at least one randomized trial of a CRC screening method (Mandel et al., 
1993). Through interpolation of Vijan et al’s compliance rates we adjust these rates in 
the sensitivity analysis (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Average gain in life expectancy across seven CRC screening strategies across 
three categories of patient compliance 
 
Two formulations of incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) were 
calculated. The first involved observing the ICER for CRC strategies after a national 
overhaul of training programs compared to a  patient receiving no treatment at all. This 
ratio is the same as Vijan et al’s except that ours incorporate the cost and improved 
effectiveness of the national overhaul. The second ICER calculation observes the 
resulting ICER when compared to the status quo supply of CRC screening strategies 
(that is, without a national overhaul of training programs). These ICERs represent the 
incremental improvements that would be expected after introducing a national overhaul 
of CRC screening residency programs. 
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Sensitivity analyses were conducted to determine the impact of altering each of 
the variables we introduced including capital costs, faculty training cost, number of total 
residents trained per program (over a ten year period), total number of new FMR CRC 
training programs, percentage of FMR CRC screening ‘graduates’ who go on to conduct 
CRC screening in their practices, and patient compliance. We tested each of these 
variables at 75% and 125% of their base case estimates. 
 
Results 
Using all of the baseline estimates, we extrapolate that 71,820 additional 
colonoscopies or 2,394 newly trained residents could perform 119,700 additional 
flexible sigmoidoscopies after ten years. We evenly distributed the costs of the training 
program overhaul across each of the procedures that would be conducted by the 
graduates of these new programs (either all colonoscopy or all flexible sigmoidoscopy; 
we did not assume that there would be a mix of training strategies). The average 
additional cost per procedure was $395 per colonoscopy (assuming colonoscopy-only 
training) and $130 for flexible sigmoidoscopy (assuming flexible sigmoidoscopy-only 
training). Even with the additional costs of the national overhaul of CRC screening 
residency programs, the cost-effectiveness ratio of all seven strategies compared with no 
screening is under $20,000 per life-year gained.  
As a result of the increase in average costs for strategies involving colonoscopy 
and flexible sigmoidoscopy, significant departures from Vijan et al’s (2001) ICERs at 
the 75 percent compliance level (our baseline) were found. These higher average costs 
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resulted in different ICERs than Vijan et al’s (2001) such that fecal occult blood test 
(FOBT) is no longer dominated, flexible sigmoidoscopy remained dominated by 
colonoscopy at 55, and colonoscopy at ages 50 and 60 years is now dominated by 
flexible sigmoidoscopy every five years combined with annual FOBT. Another 
departure from Vijan et al’s (2001) model is that colonoscopy at 60 alone now exceeds a 
willingness-to-pay threshold of $50,000 and flexible sigmoidoscopy combined with 
FOBT no longer exceeds the same threshold. The hierarchy of effectiveness for each 
strategy was also disrupted with FS every five years combined with annual FOBT now 
serving as the most effective strategy (see Table 2). 
 We also calculated the incremental cost per life year added against the existing 
supply of colonoscopists at the 50 percent compliance level. This ICER represents the 
impact of the graduates of the 38 “upgraded” FMR programs. In this portion of the 
model, none of the strategies were dominated. The ICER for FS combined with FOBT 
fell dramatically due to a significant increase (39 percent) in effectiveness as a result of 
higher compliance. 
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Table 2: Costs and effectiveness of CRC screening with and without national FMR 
training overhaul 
 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 In one-way sensitivity analyses, strategies attenuated or amplified as one might 
expect. When minimizing costs to 75 percent of our baseline estimates, colonoscopy at 
age 60 still exceeded a willingness-to-pay threshold of $50,000 ($51,399). Maximizing 
costs by 25 percent did not result in any changes in ICERs different from our model’s 
baseline results. Similar results were found for similar changes in the estimated cost of 
clinical faculty time per hour. We did not alter the number of hours required as this is a 
national standard set by ASGE, but would expect similar results. 
 We tested the sensitivity of FMR program output by 25 percent in both directions 
(see Figure 4). When programs were able to produce 79 residents over ten years, all 
Program'
Expansion Strategy
Average'Gain'in'
Life'Expectancy'
(days)
Average'Cost'($)
Relative'
Reduction'in'
Colorectal'Cancer'
Mortality'(%)
ICER'''''''''''''''''''
(No'screen'as'
baseline)
ICER'''''''''''''
(Status'quo'
equivalent'as'
baseline)
No'Screen ~ 1,300 ~ ~ ~
FOBT 5.8 1,420 32.1 Dominated ~
Colonoscopy'at'age'60'years 6.3 1,310 26.3 579 ~
Flexible'sigmoidoscopy 7.1 1,590 35.0 Dominated ~
Colonoscopy'at'age'55'years 7.3 1,360 23.1 18,250 ~
Flexible'sigmoidoscopy'+'FOBT 8.5 1,570 45.6 Dominated ~
Colonoscopy'at'ages'55'and'65'years 10.2 1,380 41.1 2,517 ~
Colonoscopy'at'ages'50'and'60'years 11.4 1,480 38.4 30,417 ~
FOBT 8.0 1,470 43.4 7,756 8,295
Colonoscopy'at'age'60'years 9.5 1,705 39.5 57,177 45,052
Flexible'sigmoidoscopy 10.7 1,859 41.0 Dominated 27,272
Colonoscopy'at'age'55'years 11.0 1,785 34.7 19,467 41,923
Colonoscopy'at'ages'55'and'65'years 14.3 1,845 56.3 6,636 41,394
Colonoscopy'at'ages'50'and'60'years 15.6 1,995 52.7 Dominated 44,754
Flexible'sigmoidoscopy'+'FOBT 15.8 1,969 61.0 30,176 19,949
No
Yes
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strategies fell well below a $50,000 willingness-to-pay threshold. However, if resident 
program output fell to an average of 47 graduates per decade, ICERs for all four 
strategies involving colonoscopy compared to status quo supply then exceeded a 
$50,000 willingness to pay threshold. Similar results were found for altering the number 
of expanded training programs and the percentage of graduates who go on to administer 
60 colonoscopies or 100 flexible sigmoidoscopies; most notably, if decreased to only 29 
programs nationally or 38 percent practice rate, all four strategies involving colonoscopy 
exceed the $50,000 willingness to pay threshold. Strategies involving flexible 
sigmoidoscopy remain well below the same threshold throughout. 
 
 
Figure 4: Tornado diagram of univariate sensitivity analysis for colonoscopy at 55 & 65 
  
Finally, if the training overhaul were to only increase national compliance from 
50 percent to 65 percent (our baseline assumed an increase to 75 percent), we find all 
four strategies involving colonoscopy with ICERs above $64,000 (see Table 3). We also 
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observe both strategies that involve flexible sigmoidoscopy to be dominated or exceed 
the willingness to pay threshold when using ‘no screen’ as baseline. Conversely, if the 
training overhaul were to increase national compliance from 50 percent to 85 percent, all 
strategies fall well below a $50,000 willingness-to-pay threshold when compared to the 
status quo supply and demand for colonoscopies. When observing ICERs with ‘no 
screen’ as baseline, we find that colonoscopy at age 60 is now dominated by FOBTs 
(which, due to their curvilinear effectiveness, become much more effective at the higher 
ends of compliance). 
 
Table 3: Univariate sensitivity analysis of patient compliance 
 
 
 
 
Subsequent)
Patient)
Adherence
Strategy
Average)Gain)in)
Life)Expectancy)
(days)
Average)Cost)($)
Relative)
Reduction)in)
Colorectal)Cancer)
Mortality)(%)
ICER)))))))))))))))))))
(No)screen)as)
baseline)
ICER)))))))))))))
(Status)quo)
equivalent)as)
baseline)
Fecal)occult)blood)test 7.1 1,450 38.9 7,690 8,295
Colonoscopy)at)age)60)years 8.2 1,705 34.2 84,605 75,086
Flexible)sigmoidoscopy 9.3 1,803 38.6 Dominated 35,990
Colonoscopy)at)age)55)years 9.5 1,773 30.1 19,092 67,899
Colonoscopy)at)ages)55)and)65)years 12.7 1,817 50.2 5,115 64,836
Flexible)sigmoidoscopy)+)FOBT 12.9 1,861 54.8 73,018 24,249
Colonoscopy)at)ages)50)and)60)years 13.9 1,947 47.0 30,179 67,637
Colonoscopy)at)age)60)years 10.7 1,705 44.8 Dominated 32,470
Fecal)occult)blood)test 11.4 1,502 47.0 1,665 5,345
Flexible)sigmoidoscopy 11.4 1,939 42.2 Dominated 29,486
Colonoscopy)at)age)55)years 12.4 1,797 39.3 103,524 31,030
Colonoscopy)at)ages)55)and)65)years 15.6 1,881 61.0 9,642 33,737
Colonoscopy)at)ages)50)and)60)years 16.9 2,055 57.1 50,405 38,297
Flexible)sigmoidoscopy)+)FOBT 17.8 2,145 64.4 37,334 22,664
85%
65%
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Discussion 
 Exploring the cost-effectiveness of CRC screening strategies is a well-traveled 
road. While colonoscopy continually proves to be one of the most effective CRC 
screening strategies (Frazier, Colditz, Fuchs, & Kuntz, 2000; Khandker et al., 2000; 
Lansdorp-Vogelaar, Knudsen, & Brenner, 2011; Telford, Levy, Sambrook, Zou, & Enns, 
2010) these analyses seldom incorporate true compliance rates and, to our knowledge, 
none to-date have incorporated the stark imbalance in demand for colonoscopy and 
supply of colonoscopists (S Vijan et al., 2004). To address this gap, a significant amount 
of resources would need to be invested in order to increase the supply of trained 
endoscopists. However, this injection of costs could, in turn, alter the well-established 
ICERs of numerous CRC screening strategies. 
 In this paper, we explored how the costs of a national overhaul of family 
medicine residency programs would interact with existing cost-effectiveness ratios for 
seven current CRC screening strategies. We contend that this approach—of training 
family medicine residents—is a lower cost strategy that would likely lead to improved 
patient compliance (Rogge et al., 1994). Our findings suggest the costs of a national 
overhaul of FMR training program would affect the ICERs of several strategies. For one, 
colonoscopy only once at age 60 now exceeds a willingness-to-pay threshold of $50,000. 
Second, flexible sigmoidoscopy combined with annual FOBTs, which is currently 
dominated by colonoscopy strategies, is no longer dominated and, in fact, proves to be 
the most effective of all strategies with an acceptable ICER well below a $50,000 
willingness-to-pay threshold. However, one could argue that improving patient 
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adherence for an annual procedure is a steeper hill to climb than improving patient 
adherence for a procedure that is only required once every 10 years. Thus, improving 
patient adherence to 85 percent for flexible sigmoidoscopy every five years combined 
with annual FOBTs would be more difficult to achieve than improving patient adherence 
for colonoscopy at ages 55 and 65. 
 Perhaps the most interesting of our findings involved the sensitivity analyses of 
assumed patient compliance. Our model shows that if a national overhaul of FMR 
training programs does not result in higher patient compliance by at least 18 percent, the 
costs of the overhaul undermine the gains in effectiveness, such that all colonoscopy 
procedures become excessively costly. Fortunately, the model also demonstrates that the 
converse is also true. If patient compliance were to improve by more than 18 percent, 
colonoscopy strategies retain their dominance and, for some strategies, even demonstrate 
improved cost-effectiveness. 
 These results suggest that careful attention ought to be given to national rates of 
compliance and how they vary among specialists and primary care physicians. 
Additional studies to replicate Rogge et al’s (1994) findings are warranted. Strategies to 
improve the rate of trained family medicine residents who go on to consistently 
administer colonoscopies and flexible sigmoidoscopies in their practices ought to be 
explored. Studies similar to this one should be conducted to explore alternative methods 
of addressing the gap between CRC screening demand and the supply of care providers 
who are able to perform them. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATION TENURE ON NURSES’ PERCEPTIONS 
OF THREE STUDER GROUP CHANGE INITIATIVES 
 
Introduction 
 US healthcare organizations are facing changes in their external and internal 
environments at unprecedented rates. Whether they are in response to policy or market 
forces, a typical healthcare organization today may have dozens of ongoing system-level 
change initiatives, ranging from information technology to quality improvement to cost 
control (Bita A Kash, Aaron Spaulding, Larry Gamm, & Christopher E Johnson, 2013). 
Most of these initiatives will at least in some way affect the work processes of hospital 
nurses. This is often by design. Despite the current trend of hospitals employing more of 
their physicians, nurses continue to be high leverage change recipients; that is, system-
level change initiatives can be diffused more efficiently via nurses—who work in 
networked units, are fully employed by the hospital, and have the highest patient 
interaction—than any other role in the organization. 
 However, system-level changes can have unintended, unanticipated impacts that 
vary greatly among units and among individuals within those units (Mohrman, 1989). 
Despite the well-traveled path of change management literature—which has identified 
implementation climate (Helfrich, Weiner, McKinney, & Minasian, 2007), innovation-
values fit (Klein & Sorra, 1996), and leadership commitment (Herold, Fedor, Caldwell, 
& Liu, 2008), among others, as critical success factors—organizational change 
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initiatives continue to fail at staggering rates. By one account, fewer than 12 percent of 
organizations are successful in managing change on a consistent basis (Tidd & Bessant, 
2011). 
This fail rate is pushing researchers to alter their approach to evaluating change. 
Herold and colleagues (2008) point out that managers are either: A) simply not applying 
what has been identified in the literature or, B) that “the focus on change management 
practices and processes has obscured other important factors that ultimately shape 
people's reactions to change.” Researchers who lean towards this latter option have 
begun to investigate less molar and more molecular factors associated with change-
related attitudes and behaviors. This line of individual-level research has discovered 
associations with self-esteem (Wiesenfeld, Brockner, & Thibault, 2000), voice in 
decision-making (Brockner et al., 2001), job impact (Fedor, Caldwell, & Herold, 2006), 
and age (Caldwell, Herold, & Fedor, 2004). The research reported in this article 
continues in this vein by examining the influence of job tenure at the individual level on 
nurse perceptions of three process changes—each with varying levels of job disruption. 
 
Organization Tenure and Change 
 An employee’s relationship with their employer has been traditionally 
conceptualized to mirror the psychological concept of life stages; that is, birth, 
development, maturity, and demise (Super, 1957).  Just as an individual’s ability, 
priorities, and outlook evolve over the course of his/her life, so too do the attitudes and 
behaviors of employees in regards to their work. We should clarify here that the term 
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tenure has been used in the literature with multiple definitions including position tenure 
(Allen & Meyer, 1993), organization tenure (Jans, 1989), and professional tenure (Lynn, 
Cao, & Horn, 1996). For this research, we focused on organization tenure, though we 
also ran our models using professional tenure as we will discuss later. We contend that 
while none of the definitions are necessarily superior to another, the definition does 
affect the implications of the results. For example, a negative relationship between 
change behavior and position tenure lends itself to understanding the impacts of 
promotion (Hoath, Schneider, & Starr, 1998); that is, the relationship could be explained, 
in part, by frustrated senior position-holders who feel overlooked for promotion or, 
conversely, who are content and do not seek further promotion. Meanwhile, a negative 
relationship between change behavior and professional tenure might lend itself to 
understanding career burnout (Reilly & Orsak, 1991). For the purposes of this study 
organization tenure was selected as the principal independent variable as the dependent 
variables—three process change initiatives—were organization-level initiatives affecting 
almost all nurses in the organization equally and at the same time, regardless of position 
or professional tenure. In other words, the process change initiatives were not targeted at 
any specific nurse position or any particular strata of nurse experience level, but instead 
to the entire body of nurses in the organization. 
 With the definition of tenure agreed upon, we then explored prior research that 
investigated tenure as its own independent variable and not just as a peripheral variable 
that ought to be controlled for. The latter is commonplace in management research as 
tenure is habitually used to reduce the confounding effect between more marquee 
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independent and dependent variables (see Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2002, for 
an example). Substantial amounts of research have been conducted linking tenure with a 
number of psychosocial measures, often times with conflicting results. For example, 
affective organizational commitment has been shown to both increase with tenure 
(Mathieu & Zajac, 1990), decrease with tenure (Beck & Wilson, 2000), and exhibit U-
shaped trends as well (Morrow & McElroy, 1987). Similar mixed results have been 
found with regards to tenure and job satisfaction (Kacmar & Ferris, 1989), job 
performance (Wright & Bonett, 2002), and burnout (Martin & Schinke, 1998). 
Very little research though was found that directly examined the relationship 
between organization tenure and perceptions towards change initiatives. Van Dam and 
colleagues (2008) found a positive relationship between tenure and change resistance. 
Similarly, Hornung and Rousseau (2007) found a negative relationship, albeit weak, 
between tenure and anticipated benefit related to change. Most of the other connections 
we found in our literature review asserted similar arguments, though through transitive 
means (Iverson, 1996; Mumford & Smith, 2004). 
Finally, when we limited our search to studies only involving nurses as the 
recipients of change we found only two studies that examined the relationship between 
nurse tenure and reactions to change initiatives. In both cases, researchers found a 
positive relationship with job tenure and compliance with new safety measures 
(McGovern et al., 2000; Nichol et al., 2008). These findings are peculiar in that they are 
in direct opposition to findings from studies discussed earlier, where change recipients 
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with more tenure exhibited behavior less receptive towards change initiatives than their 
new-to-the-organization counterparts. 
This begs the question of whether nurses are perhaps different from non-nurses 
in their proclivity to change or, alternatively, if reactions to change are simply dependent 
on the type of change being implemented. If it is the former, perhaps nurses (or any 
professional worker for that matter) with more tenure interpret the likely impact or 
effectiveness of an intervention differently than those who are newer to the organization. 
In both McGovern et al’s (2000) study and Nichol et al’s (2008) study, the authors 
proposed the positive effect of tenure was likely due to more experienced nurses 
incorporating personal experiences and judgments into their attitudes and behaviors 
towards the change initiative. In both studies the change initiatives were safety-related 
interventions that, the authors argue, would have found higher favor with more senior 
nurses. As nurses with more years in an organization would have had or witnessed more 
‘near misses’ and preventable events than junior nurses, they would place more value in 
preventing such events in the future. This observation falls into line with Weick’s (1995) 
concept of sensemaking in organization—where individuals create connections between 
past interactions and events in order to anticipate trajectories for current decisions. 
However, in neither of these two studies did researchers attempt to capture 
attitudes or behaviors towards distinctly different types of interventions. Nichols et al 
(2008) only looked at use of facial protection. Although McGovern et al (2000) looked 
at multiple interventions, they were, by design,  quite similar (e.g., wearing disposable 
gloves, eye shields, face masks, etc.) as to allow the researchers to collapse the 
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individual measures into two general safety categories. In order to better understand 
when a nurse’s tenure might work in favor of a change initiative and when it might work 
against it, one would need to observe nurses’ perceptions across multiple, distinctly 
different change interventions. Doing so would allow us to explore whether nurses 
within different categories of tenure do, in fact, react differently to a given change 
initiative. Furthermore, it would allow us to examine if the direction and discrepancy 
between categories of tenure varies or remains constant across different change 
initiatives. Finally, it would allow us to begin to understand which types of interventions 
are more likely to be viewed favorably or unfavorably across categories of organization 
tenure. The research performed in this article sought to conduct this very type of study. 
In addition to evaluating perceptions across different interventions, we also 
wanted to explore possible sources of discrepancy by tenure within each intervention. 
Specifically, we were interested in capturing nurses’ perceptions of the intervention’s 
impact on patient care, unit work change, and individual job change (more information 
on these three subscales can be found in the methods section of this paper). We contend 
this level of granularity will provide additional insight into the variance that has been 
observed in other similar research (McGovern et al., 2000; Nichol et al., 2008). Finding 
high variance in one of these subscales but not in another could have significant 
implications. For example, if senior nurses exhibit no differences than their junior 
counterparts in their perceptions of an intervention’s impact on patient care, but do 
exhibit differences for perceived impact on individual job change, this would guide 
managers and researchers to further investigate how senior nurses frame their job 
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processes differently than junior nurses. Perhaps the intervention truly does impact 
senior nurses’ work processes differently than junior nurses. Such a finding would 
concede that senior nurses thought just as high (or low) as their junior counterparts of the 
intervention’s impact on patient care. Conversely, if the only discrepancy found is within 
the patient impact subscale, managers and researchers would need to subsequently 
examine (or convey) which category of nurses is more accurately predicting the 
intervention’s true impact on patient care (e.g., reduced falls, fewer hospital acquired 
infections, improved patient satisfaction scores, etc.). It is not likely that both groups are 
correct in their perceptions.   
To examine perceptions across multiple, distinct change interventions we 
conducted our study in a large, metropolitan, multi-hospital health system that had 
implemented Studer Group’s “Evidence Based Leadership” (EBL) 30 months prior. EBL 
is designed to be a system wide change intervention that is enacted through a series of 
behavior-modifying tools (see Table 4). These tools act as agents of standardization 
across all hospital sites and units, and are expected to be practiced throughout the entire 
organization. By focusing on behaviors, EBL follows the James-Lange theory of change 
by focusing on behaviors within organizations rather than values or attitudes (Burke, 
2011; Porras & Robertson, 1992). 
Given its relative newness to the organizational development (OD) scene, EBL 
has been evaluated very little by organization change researchers. Vest and Gamm’s 
systematic review (2009) revealed only one empirically-driven publication on EBL, and 
it focused exclusively on but one EBL tool—nurse rounding on patients (C.M. Meade, 
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A.L. Bursell, & L. Ketelsen, 2006). However, the EBL intervention fit perfectly with our 
research agenda. First, its multiple “tools” are distinctly different from one another 
unlike previous research that only evaluated one work process intervention (Nichol et 
al., 2008) or one set of similar interventions (McGovern et al., 2000). Second, the 
multiple tools are all implemented in close proximity to one another. This assists our 
design by minimizing the impact of recall bias. While this form of bias would still be 
present for us, we would expect for the bias to be relatively equal across all 
interventions. Finally, all of the interventions are introduced to units by a Studer Group 
coach who helps train nurse managers and oversees the implementation of each tool. 
This mitigates at least one type of selection bias—that nurses with different tenure might 
have received different training or were held to different standards. 
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Table 4: Definitions for the ten principal work process tools of Studer Group's 
"EBL" 
 
 
 
  
EBL Tool Description
AIDET
Communication checklist that all hospital employees  utilize 
when interacting with a patient: Acknowledge, Introduce, 
Duration, Explanation, Thank You
Discharge Phone Calls
Post-discharge follow up mechanism that allows nurses to 
inquire about medication adherence, issues with pain, and 
follow-up appointments
High Medium Low
A simplified human resource rubric that calls for managers to 
rate their staff and identify areas for improvement. Multiple 
offense low performers are terminated.
Hourly Rounding on Patients
Nurses check-in on their patients on an hourly basis during 
awake hours to check on comfort levels
Leader Evaluation Manager
Automated performance evaluation application for mid-level 
managers
Leadership Development Institute
A quarterly meeting hosted at an offsite location that is 
attended by all managers, directors, VPs and C-Suite to share 
best practices, report on outocmes, and meet peers
Monthly Meeting Model
Monthly reporting template for all who report to Vice Presidents 
or higher
Reward and Recognition
Hand-written notes from managers sent to employee's home to 
compliment and thank them for their work
Rounding on Employees
Managers check-in regularly on their staff to identify positive 
outcomes or problem areas  that should be addressed or 
escalated
Rounding on Internal Customers Interdepartmental evaluation of services and needs
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Methods 
Sample 
Participants were medical-surgery nurses at four hospitals in a large 
metropolitan, academic health system. Medical-surgery nurses were targeted in an effort 
to maximize potential sample size within the health system while decreasing inter-role 
variation that might mask valid associations (type II error). The institutional review 
boards of the author’s institution and the health system approved the survey protocol. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The survey was sent electronically 
to 1,593 medical-surgery nurses belonging to 44 distinct hospital units across four 
system hospitals. The survey was administered approximately 30 months after the 
initiation of the EBL implementation. Nurses were notified that their participation 
entered them in a drawing for one of three gift cards worth 50 USD. 427 nurses 
completed the survey (27 percent response rate). Though low, this rate is within the 
range of acceptability for similar studies dealing with healthcare professionals (Barlow, 
Dietz, Klish, & Trowbridge, 2002; Schneider, Gallery, Schafermeyer, & Zwemer, 2003; 
Shortell et al., 2001). We discuss later an additional argument for why this low response 
rate in the context of this study is not as serious a threat of selection bias as one might 
conclude for other studies. Finally, some nurse units were structured so that only one or 
two nurses in a unit would be responsible for conducting all discharge phone calls within 
a unit. Therefore, for questions related to discharge phone call, our sample size was 
further reduced to 204 participants, as we were only interested in results from nurses 
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who personally conducted discharge phone calls. Respondent characteristics are 
presented in Table 5.  
Respondents tenure with the health system were reported as follows: <1 year (15 
percent), 1-5 years (47 percent), 6-10 years (23 percent), 11-15 years (8 percent), 16-20 
years (2 percent), and >21 years (6 percent). For power issues, tenure was reduced to 
three categories: <1 year, 1-5 years, and >5 years. Respondents represented 41 distinct 
hospital units across four of the system’s hospitals. Ninety percent of respondents were 
female. Due to IRB restrictions of the study site, we were unable to attain global 
characteristics of the organization’s medical-surgery nurse population for comparison 
purposes. In the discussion section we argue why, given our study’s design, this is not as 
serious a threat of selection bias as one might conclude in other studies.  
 
Table 5: Respondent characteristics by dependent variable 
 
 
Measures 
The survey was designed to capture data on nurses’ perceptions towards three 
EBL tools and their impact on patient care, unit work change, and individual work 
change. To keep the survey length to a minimum, the instrument focused on only three 
of the ten EBL tools: AIDET, hourly rounding on patients, and discharge phone calls. 
N % Female
% with <1 
Year Tenure
% with 1-5 
Years Tenure
% with >5 
Years Tenure
AIDET Respondents 401 89 15 47 38
Hourly Rounding Respondents 395 90 15 47 38
Discharge Phone Call Respondents 204 88 17 48 36
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The health system’s administrators had identified these three tools as being the most 
disruptive for nurses during an earlier portion of this study (National Science Foundation 
Grant No. IIP-0832439). 
Impact on patient care: Healthcare organization change interventions such as 
EBL can be multifaceted in their approach, but a likely underlying aim is to improve the 
patient care experience. Nursing literature is full of examples of nurses discounting 
personal inconveniences for change interventions that demonstrate obvious 
improvements in patient care (for a few examples, see Anderson, 2000; Rosenman, 
Simms, Kay, & Adelman, 1977; L. Walker & Gilson, 2004; Williams, Harris, Randall, 
Nichols, & Brown, 2003). This observation has also been found in research outside of 
healthcare where a change intervention’s positive impact has been associated with 
change recipients’ positive emotional responses towards the intervention (Choi & Price, 
2005; Hartwick & Barki, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1988). Thus, our first subscale 
measured nurses’ perceptions of the impact of three EBL tools on patient care. Four 
questions (α = .90, .91, .82 for AIDET, hourly rounding, and DPC, respectively) were 
adapted from the Job Satisfaction Scale for Nurses (Ng, 1993), a scale that has 
demonstrated high reliability and construct validity (Van Saane, Sluiter, Verbeek, & 
Frings‐Dresen, 2003). The four items comprising this scale are: “(AIDET, hourly 
rounding, DPC) has a high impact on patient satisfaction,” “(AIDET, hourly rounding, 
DPC) is useful for gaining information that is helpful in providing care,” “(AIDET, 
hourly rounding, DPC) appears to help reduce patient anxiety,” and “(AIDET, hourly 
rounding, DPC) helps establish relationships with patients’ families.” Ratings were on a 
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7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), with options for “neutral” and 
“I do not know.”  
Impact on unit work change: The consequences of a change intervention at the 
unit level have been shown to affect employee commitment to the organization (Fedor et 
al., 2006) and to the change initiative itself (Molinsky, 1999). Organizational justice 
concepts can be applied in this context to understand how the burden of EBL is 
dispersed among units during its implementation (procedural justice) and whether the 
outcomes of EBL are properly attributed back to change agents and recipients 
(distributive justice). Our second subscale measured nurses’ individual perceptions of 
the impact of the three EBL tools on their collective unit. Two questions (α = .86, .81, 
.82 for AIDET, hourly rounding, and DPC, respectively) were adapted from Fedor and 
colleagues’ (2006) multilevel investigation of organizational change. The two items 
comprising this scale are: “I believe that (AIDET, hourly rounding, DPC) has positively 
contributed to this unit's overall employee satisfaction,” and “I believe that (AIDET, 
hourly rounding, DPC) has positively contributed to this unit's overall quality of care.” 
Ratings were on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), with 
options for “neutral” and “I do not know.” 
Impact on individual job change: Proximal work impact—that is, a change 
affecting one’s own job requirements (Fedor et al., 2006)—serves as the basis for our 
third subscale. For the purposes of this subscale, we adopted Cable and DeRue’s (2002) 
approach to measuring individual-level change by parsing “demands-abilities fit.” This 
concept contends that organizations exhibit stability when the demands of the work 
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match with the ability of the worker. In the context of organizational change initiatives, 
we apply this concept to understand how a change initiative alters the demands placed 
on nurses and whether those new demands can be addressed with the existing abilities of 
nurses (Caldwell et al., 2004). Our third subscale measured nurses’ perceptions of the 
impact of the three EBL tools on their individual job change. Three questions (α = .77, 
.74, .64 for AIDET, hourly rounding, and DPC, respectively) were adapted from 
Caldwell and colleagues’ (2004) organizational change and individual differences 
questionnaire. The three items comprising this scale were “I am comfortable in 
performing (AIDET, hourly rounding, DPC),” “(AIDET, hourly rounding, DPC) has 
become a routine part of my job,” and “(AIDET, hourly rounding, DPC) improves the 
efficiency of my work.” Ratings were on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree), with options for “neutral” and “I do not know.” 
 
Analysis 
 Factor scores were calculated for each of the three subscales across the three 
EBL tools, providing a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. These scores are 
weighted canonical composites of all items in the factor analysis (Kalichman, Gueritault-
Chalvin, & Demi, 2000; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Promax rotation was used as we 
believed there to be a possible correlation among the three subscales (Cureton & Mulaik, 
1975). A scree test confirmed the presence of three factors in the instrument with 
expected, satisfactory loadings for all but one item: item #3 in the individual job change 
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subscale fell below .5. However, after determining that its presence improved the 
subscale’s alpha, it was decided to leave the item in the factor score calculation. 
 A MANOVA was first performed for each EBL tool to protect against inflating 
the Type 1 error rate in the follow-up ANOVAs (Cramer & Bock, 1966). Having 
satisfied significance thresholds with MANOVA, individual differences among tenure 
categories were subsequently examined using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and post 
hoc tests (Scheffe’s method).  
 
Results 
 The MANOVA was performed to test the hypothesis that there would be one or 
more mean differences between the three tenure categories (<1 year, 1-5 years, & >5 
years) and our three subscales (impact on: patient care, unit work change, and individual 
job change). This was conducted for each of the three EBL tools (see Table 3). Before 
performing ANOVAs on each of the three subscales, the homogeneity of variance 
assumption was tested using Bartlett’s test for equal variances. Results for all three 
subscales across all three EBL tools were not conclusive that the homogeneity 
assumption had been satisfied. Therefore, we simulated the pattern of sample sizes and 
standard deviations while holding the means constant, to calculate the type I error rate 
that would be expected given this pattern of data (Mitchell, 2008). These simulations 
revealed favorable p values for all but two of the nine subscale-tool matches (see Table 
3) indicating the Bartlett’s test scores were reacting to non-normality versus 
homoscedasticity (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989) and that ANOVA would be robust. 
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(There were no changes in significance between the non-simulated ANOVAs and the 
simulated ANOVAs, but the more conservative simulated p values are reported in Table 
6.) 
 
Table 6: MANOVA statistics 
 
 
ANOVAS were then performed on each of the three subscales acting as 
dependent variables for each of the three EBL tools. As can be seen in Table 7, seven of 
the nine ANOVAs were significant. Effect sizes were calculated (partial η2) for each 
ANOVA and ranged from a low of .023 (discharge phone call impact on unit work 
change) to a high of .052 (AIDET on unit work change). 
Lastly, post-hoc analyses were conducted using Scheffe’s method to examine 
individual mean difference comparisons across all three levels of tenure and all three 
subscales for each EBL tool. 
 
Dependent Variable Pillais’ Trace F Significance
AIDET 0.067 4.58 0.0001
Hourly Rounding 0.061 4.08 0.0005
Discharge Phone Calls 0.059 2.03 0.0611
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Table 7: Univariate comparisons for variables in the MANOVA 
 
Bold = p < .05 | Column 1: <1 Year vs. 1-5 Years | Column 2: 1-5 Years vs. >5 Years | 
Column 3: >5 Years vs. <1 Year 
 
AIDET 
For AIDET, a statistically significant MANOVA effect was found: Pillais’ Trace 
= .07, F(6, 792) = 4.61 (p < 0.001). The multivariate model’s effect size was estimated at 
.07, implying that 7 percent of the variance of the canonical variable for AIDET can be 
accounted for by organizational tenure. ANOVAS for each of the three subscales were 
statistically significant. Descending means were found for each subscale indicating 
novice nurses thought higher of AIDET than intermediate nurses, and intermediate 
nurses thought higher of AIDET than veteran nurses (see Figure 5). Seven of the nine 
post-hoc mean comparisons were statistically significant (p < .05) as indicated in bold in 
Table 7. The difference in means between novice nurses’ perceptions of impact on 
patient care and that of intermediate nurses approached significance (p = .072). There 
<1 Year 1-5 Years >5 Years F Significance Partial Eta2
AIDET - Patient Care .359 (.67) .053 (.89) -.214 (1.05) 8.93 0.001 0.043
AIDET - Unit Work Change .401 (.49) .030 (.77) -.193 (1.03) 11.41 0.001 0.052
AIDET - Individual Job Change .262 (.64) .086 (.75) -.212 (1.00) 8.91 0.001 0.042
Hourly Rounding - Patient Care .307 (.77) .046 (.94) -.181 (1.00) 6.44 0.001 0.031
Hourly Rounding - Unit Work Change .344 (.49) .010 (.78) -.148 (.96) 8.19 0.001 0.038
Hourly Rounding - Individual Job Change .189 (.65) .087 (.79) -.187 (.94) 6.47 0.001 0.031
DPC - Patient Care .270 (.83) -.080 (.94) -.027 (.96) 2.38 0.083 0.018
DPC - Unit Work Change .276 (.73) -.015 (.80) -.102 (.91) 3.70 0.026 0.023
DPC - Individual Job Change .048 (.86) .036 (.74) -.066 (.82) 0.44 0.654 0.004
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was not a significant difference found between novice and intermediate nurses’ 
perceptions of individual job change (p = .395). 
 
 
Figure 5: Adjusted 95% confidence interval plot for AIDET 
 
Hourly Rounding 
For hourly rounding, a statistically significant MANOVA was found: Pillais’ 
Trace = .061, F(6, 782) = 4.08 (p < 0.001). The multivariate model’s effect size was 
estimated at .06, implying that 6 percent of the variance of the canonical variable for 
hourly rounding can be accounted for by organizational tenure. ANOVAS for each of 
the three subscales were statistically significant. Descending means were found for each 
subscale indicating novice nurses thought higher of hourly rounding than intermediate 
nurses, and intermediate nurses thought higher of hourly rounding than veteran nurses 
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(see Figure 6). However, only five of the nine post-hoc mean comparisons were 
statistically significant (p < .05) as indicated in bold in Table 7. For perceived impact on 
patient care, the only significant means difference was between novice nurses and 
veteran nurses. Differences between novice and intermediate, and intermediate and 
veteran were not significant. For perceptions of unit work change, significant differences 
were found between novice and intermediate, and novice and veteran, however the 
difference between intermediate and veteran was not significant. Finally, there was not a 
significant difference found between novice and intermediate nurses’ perceptions of 
individual job change, but significant differences were found between intermediate and 
veteran, and novice and veteran. 
 
 
Figure 6: Adjusted 95% confidence interval plot for hourly 
rounding 
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Discharge Phone Calls 
For discharge phone calls, the MANOVA was found to only approach statistical 
significance: Pillais’ Trace = .059, F(6, 400) = 2.03 (p < 0.061). ANOVAS for two of the 
three subscales were also not statistically significant—patient care and individual job 
change. Only the unit work change ANOVA was statistically significant (p = .023). 
Descending means were not found for each subscale as had occurred with AIDET and 
hourly rounding (see Figure 7). Only one of the nine post-hoc mean comparisons was 
statistically significant (p < .05) with veteran nurses thinking less positively of discharge 
phone calls impact on unit work change than novice nurses. 
 
 
Figure 7: Adjusted 95% confidence interval plot for discharge 
phone calls 
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Additional MANOVAs were subsequently performed that included participants’ 
“total years in healthcare” as an independent variable to determine if our three categories 
of tenure were potentially acting as a proxy for a more global independent variable such 
as total years of healthcare experience or age. Had this been the case, we would have 
expected to find equivalent or larger effect sizes in these models. The first follow-up 
MANOVA used “total years in healthcare” as a lone independent variable. This model, 
while significant (p = .001), produced a smaller effect size (Pillai’s Trace = .067) than 
the tenure only model. A second follow-up MANOVA included both “total years in 
healthcare” and tenure, and also allowed for an interaction term between the two. 
However, in this model neither the main effects for either variable, nor the 2-way 
interaction term was significant (p = .28, p = .21, p = .89, respectively). 
 
Discussion 
 This research has confirmed that in at least some cases, significant differences in 
perceptions do exist depending on how long you have been in an organization. However, 
we have also seen that this rule of thumb does not always hold. While similar findings 
were also discovered for professional tenure, it appears that organization tenure is a 
more powerful predictor of nurses’ reactions to change. 
Looking across the three interventions it does not appear that the senior-most 
nurses categorically think less of the interventions than their junior counterparts. These 
mixed results actually support the design of this study. Recall that we previously 
hypothesized that a likely cause for previous studies’ conflicting results (that is, both 
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positive and negative findings associated with increasing tenure) is the nature of the 
intervention itself. Had we conducted this same study using AIDET as our only 
dependent variable, our results could have lead us to believe that an almost perfectly 
linear, negative relationship exists between organization tenure and the belief that 
AIDET positively impacts patients, nurses, and the units they work in. Conversely, had 
the study only focused on discharge phone calls as the intervention our results would 
have been mostly insignificant and we might have concluded that tenure does not in fact 
play a part in nurses’ perceptions towards change interventions. Similar to stepping back 
from a Seurat, this study’s design allowed us to simultaneously view multiple points 
that, together, tell a different story than had we simply analyzed any one of those points 
in isolation. 
 AIDET appears to be the one EBL tool that exhibited a negative, linear 
relationship with organization tenure, particularly with regards to perceived impact on 
unit level change. This trend has been identified in other research, although not specific 
to a communication checklist such as AIDET (Hornung & Rousseau, 2007; Van Dam et 
al., 2008). Nurses new to the organization expressed the highest mean favorability 
ratings for AIDET than either hourly rounding or discharge phone calls. Meanwhile 
nurses with more than five years of experience expressed the lowest mean favorability 
ratings for AIDET than either hourly rounding or discharge phone calls. This could be 
attributed to multiple factors. For one, nurses new to the organization might appreciate 
knowing specifically what is expected of them and thus, not perceive this as a threat to 
their autonomy but instead as an approved behavior template. Conversely, intermediate 
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and senior nurses, who have been with the organization long enough to know what is 
expected of them, might perceive this as a threat to their autonomy. Second, there do 
appear to be conflicting perceptions about the impact of AIDET on patient care. Our 
findings indicate that long-tenure nurses do not believe that AIDET is as beneficial to 
patients as their intermediate or junior counterparts. Through the lens of organizational 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995), it would appear that  more tenured nurses have an opposing 
narrative—shaped by experiences—that lead them to be more skeptical about this 
particular process change. To address this, researchers might empirically measure 
AIDET’s true impact on patient care (e.g. pre/post design on patient satisfaction scores). 
Results from such a study would either validate or reject the perceptions of these nurses. 
However, void of such evidence, it is likely that each category of tenure will instead 
continue to selectively observe instances of AIDET that align with their personal beliefs 
(Robert King Merton, 1968). 
 Hourly rounding on patients produced mixed results across categories of tenure. 
For perceived impact on patient care, the only significant difference found was between 
junior nurses and senior nurses. For perceived impact on unit work change, junior nurses 
stood out in favor of the initiative whereas intermediate and senior nurses exhibited less 
favorable perceptions that were significantly different than their junior counterparts. 
When these two results are viewed in tandem it appears that although there is some 
agreement that hourly rounding has a positive impact on patients, nurses who have been 
with the organization for more than one year perceive its impact on unit work change 
less favorably. 
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 Finally, the findings for discharge phone calls, though non-significant, do still 
provide insight in the context of this study. Whereas AIDET and hourly rounding 
painted an undesirable picture for change agents having to deal with anyone other than 
new hires, it appears that with some change initiatives, veterans to an organization are 
not unconditionally opposed to change. This should be reaffirming for change agents and 
healthcare leaders. While we do not believe that all of the needed changes in healthcare 
can be neatly packaged into initiatives that are equally favored by new hires and senior 
employees alike, we do believe that there are more change initiatives out there that, 
similar to discharge phone calls, can lead to meaningful improvements in care delivery 
without necessarily being such a “tough pill to swallow.” Managers who are aware of 
these varying perceptions across initiatives can tailor the sequencing of change 
initiatives to avoid overwhelming those who might be more skeptical. 
 
Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations. As discussed earlier, though consistent 
with similar published studies (Barlow et al., 2002; Schneider et al., 2003; Shortell et al., 
2001), this study suffers from poor response rate, which typically presents a threat of 
selection bias. However, we counter this argument by calling into question the plausible 
alternative hypothesis—that nurses within categories of tenure self-selected into the 
survey as a result of some unmeasured confounder (e.g., favorable/unfavorable 
disposition towards the change initiative). However, at no point was any nurse aware 
that their categorization of tenure would serve as the principal independent variable. 
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Thus, we would contend that such a confounder would likely be present across multiple 
categories of tenure. So if nurses who viewed EBL in a less positive light were more 
likely to participate in the survey, do we have any reason to believe such a bias would 
only exist in one category of tenure and not the others? Similarly, our data appear to be 
skewed female. However, if this skew were impacting our results, we would expect the 
bias to be affecting the three categories of tenure equally given that the skew was equal 
across all three categories.   
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CHAPTER IV 
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS ON CHARGE 
CAPTURE: A SECOND GENERATION EHR RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
Introduction 
Recent data indicates healthcare providers are only slowly getting behind the 
adoption of electronic health records (Charles, King, Patel, & Furukawa, 2013). Despite 
the federal government’s carrot and stick approach via the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009, providers remain 
skeptical of the technology. For example as of December 2013, fewer than 14 percent of 
office-based physicians have adopted EHR systems with the capabilities to support at 
least 14 Stage Two meaningful use requirements (C. Hsiao & Hing, 2014). Researchers 
have looked into providers’ and allied health professionals’ causes for concern and have 
uncovered a wide range of issues, many of which have further strengthened their 
recalcitrance. For example, providers and administrators often fear the negative impact 
of EHR adoption on physician productivity. This fear was recently validated by Huerta 
and colleagues (2013), who found that hospitals that had recently adopted EHRs 
exhibited lower productivity gains than hospitals who had not yet adopted the 
technology. However, Adler-Milstein and Huckman (2013) found the exact opposite to 
be true in ambulatory settings. 
Debate on EHRs and their true impact on care quality also persist. Providers and 
administrators continually dispute whether or not EHRs actually improve quality of care. 
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Research on this front has also returned mixed results. For example, Zhou and 
colleagues (2009) could find no linkages between EHR use and six quality of care 
composite scores. However, these findings conflict with others who have found weak, 
but positive linkages between EHR use and improved process compliance (Bardhan & 
Thouin, 2013; Patterson, Marken, Simon, Hackman, & Schaefer, 2012; T. J. Spaulding 
& Raghu, 2013), improved patient satisfaction (Kazley, Diana, Ford, & Menachemi, 
2012) and reduction in medication errors (Radley et al., 2013). 
Still other identified barriers to EHR adoption include new costs to an 
organization (both upfront capital costs and recurring maintenance fees) (Jha et al., 
2009), interoperability with existing systems (Abramson, McGinnis, Moore, & Kaushal, 
2014), and inadequate training and onsite technical support (Jamoom, Patel, Furukawa, 
& King, 2014), though each of these barriers are perceived to be higher by those who 
have not yet adopted EHRs versus those who already have an EHR in place (Abramson 
et al., 2014; Jamoom et al., 2014). 
This last finding—of varying perceptions between the EHR haves and EHR 
have-nots—suggests at least two issues that could explain the industry’s staccato-like 
diffusion of EHR adoption. The first is that researchers have possibly been premature in 
their summative evaluations and too vocal in their formative evaluations. The second is 
that researchers have been unable to study organizations whose compositions and local 
environments are similar to the EHR have-nots. Fortunately, both of these issues can be 
addressed through a more strategic research approach—something we are calling a 
“second generation of EHR research.” In the following section, we briefly discuss these 
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two issues and explain how current and future EHR research can mitigate these 
problems. This second generation EHR research, we contend, stands to be both 
statistically stronger and more informative to healthcare decision-makers in 
organizations who have yet to implement an EHR. For the record, we are not attempting 
to debase existing EHR research that was conducted on organizations prior to the 
HITECH Act of 2009. Rather, we contend that because these organizations opted into 
EHRs prior to the policy change, they are likely different in their composition, structure, 
or culture (or some combination thereof) compared to the organizations that, as of 2014, 
still do not have EHRs. We conclude with such an example of second generation EHR 
research by exploring the impact of an EHR adoption on charge capture for a large 
pediatric physician network. 
 
EHR Research Issue #1: Short Game vs. Long Game 
The first issue we explore surrounding the discrepancies between the EHR haves 
and the EHR have-nots is how and why perceived barriers to EHR adoption are not as 
menacing as their realized counterparts, yet persist nonetheless (Abramson et al., 2014; 
Jamoom et al., 2014). We propose that one source of this discrepancy is that EHR-wary 
organizations have simply heard too many EHR “horror stories” and have entered a 
wait-and-see hibernation. Indeed, the literature is full of examples of healthcare 
organizations spending millions of dollars on botched EHR implementations (for a small 
sampling see Blumenthal & Glaser, 2007; Connolly, 2005; Kemper, Uren, & Clark, 
2006; Kumar & Aldrich, 2010). However, this initial surge of bad press ought to have 
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been expected. We would expect to encounter more failures than success stories in the 
first few months and years immediately after the HITECH Act. A doomed EHR 
implementation is much easier and quicker to spot (and publish) than an incremental 
improvement in cost, quality, or access. The former could become apparent within 
weeks of an EHR go-live. The latter might not be detectable for months or possibly even 
years. 
The existing body of EHR implementation literature—what we will refer to as 
first generation EHR research—ought to be additionally scrutinized when we consider 
how few organizations have actually fully implemented and exploited their EHR. Jha and 
colleagues (2009) found that while nearly one quarter of US hospitals report having a 
basic EHR in place, only 1.5 percent meet the criteria of having a comprehensive EHR 
system—that is, a system that leverages all four clinical components (computerized 
physician order entry (CPOE), decision support, imaging, and interorganizational health 
information exchange capacity) and is present in all clinical units in the organization. 
Similar results were found for office-based physicians with more than half reporting the 
presence of an EHR, but only one-third of those also reported consistent use of “basic 
features” such as patient demographics, laboratory and imaging results, problem lists, 
clinical notes, or computerized prescription ordering (Decker, Jamoom, & Sisk, 2012). 
This astoundingly low percentage should alarm consumers of EHR research. If we were 
to audit the entire body of first generation EHR research, what percentage of those 
studies were likely conducted on organizations with a mere shell of an EHR? Is that fair 
to the EHR? 
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Regardless, it is understandable why so many healthcare organizations are still in 
a wait-and-see mode. If we were to anthropomorphize an organization, all of these 
negative, oftentimes sensational anecdotes would surely rouse an organization’s 
amygdala more so than any marginally positive anecdote or investigation (Kensinger, 
2007). As a result, a sluggish diffusion of EHRs is a perfectly logical outcome. This 
phenomenon would at least partially explain the discrepancy between perceived versus 
realized barriers to EHR adoption.  
Fortunately, researchers have the tools and the ability to now lead a second 
generation of EHR research that is statistically stronger and focuses more on the “long 
game” of an EHR versus the “short game”. The most important variable that will 
differentiate the second generation of EHR research from the first generation is time. 
Though simplistic, researchers are now gaining access to longitudinal EHR datasets that 
will greatly improve the internal validity of their research. Although robust longitudinal 
datasets did exist prior to 2009, they would have belonged to historically progressive, 
technology-focused organizations with decades of experience in health information 
technology (Tang & McDonald, 2006). (The issue of generalizability of first generation 
EHR research is a separate issue we will discuss in the following section). More often, 
first generation EHR researchers were limited to only one or a few cross-sectional 
‘snapshots’ of post-implementation data. In some cases, these snapshots did not include 
pre-intervention data since many organizations were now tracking some variables for the 
first time in their history (Burton, Anderson, & Kues, 2004). Even when researchers did 
have pre/post data, they likely had fewer post-intervention data points due to the 
! ! !
73 !
recentness of the EHR implementation. Furthermore, many of these post-implementation 
data were likely for an organization with a mere shell of an EHR in place rather than a 
comprehensive EHR being used uniformly across the organization (Jha et al., 2009). 
Given the nature of these first generation data sources, researchers likely had 
much higher threats to internal validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) including: 
regression toward the mean (e.g., too few post-intervention data points prevented 
researchers from observing an eventual return to the mean, whether that might have been 
beneficial or not to the EHR), history (e.g., other concurrent organizational change 
initiatives or environmental shocks were also contributing to observed deltas but too few 
post-intervention data points prevented researchers from acknowledging or controlling 
for the concurrent event), or even Borg’s (1984) notion of resentful demoralization (e.g., 
providers who were adamantly opposed to the EHR—a well-documented phenomena 
(Doolan & Bates, 2002; Ludwick & Doucette, 2009; Sassen, 2009)—deliberately 
opposed the EHR in its infancy in an effort to negatively affect its impacts and postpone 
its adoption. More post-intervention data points in this scenario would have either: A) 
revealed that these providers eventually “came around” to the EHR, or, B) ruled out this 
threat altogether by demonstrating that provider recalcitrance remained constant across 
an extended period of time). 
Having the added benefit of time as an independent variable, second generation 
EHR research can now transition away from cross-sectional and low-observation count 
repeated measures designs and move towards high-observation count longitudinal 
designs—a superior approach in the hierarchy of research design. Such longitudinal 
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studies with both pre- and post-intervention data afford researchers the opportunity “for 
controlled and uniform measurement of exposure history and other factors related to 
outcomes” (Ware, 1985). This opportunity is precisely how second generation EHR data 
analysis can generate more reliable results. By focusing on the “long game” of EHR 
adoption, this research will inform practitioners not only of the initial impacts of the 
technology, but also its intermediate and long-term outcomes. 
 
EHR Research Issue #2: The Downside of Evaluating Pioneers 
A second likely factor contributing to the disparate perceptions between the EHR 
haves and have-nots is that perhaps researchers have been unable to study the 
‘everyman’ of healthcare organizations. As we discussed in the previous section, first 
generation EHR researchers had little choice but to look to the progressive EHR 
“pioneers” of the US healthcare industry for a sufficiently powered longitudinal dataset. 
However these organizations were structurally and culturally unique. Sociology and 
diffusion of innovation research has argued that atypicality is a key differentiator for 
successful innovators, or in our case, EHR pioneers (Granovetter, 1973; Rogers, 2010). 
This is problematic for researchers. While study of such pioneer organizations may be 
intriguing for fellow researchers and policy-makers, it is not necessarily actionable for 
non-EHR-using providers and administrators. For example, EHR success stories from 
Veterans Health Administration carry little weight for an independent long-term care 
facility that is on the market for its first EHR. Similarly, demonstrating cost-savings 
through EHR use at Intermountain Healthcare or Mayo Clinic—both of which are 
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historically progressive, technology-oriented integrated care systems (Tang & 
McDonald, 2006)—is not necessarily generalizable to an independent, three-provider 
primary care practice in south Texas. 
This notion is supported by research on the perceived barriers of EHR adoption. 
For example, Kemper and colleagues (2006) found that 32 percent of large pediatric 
practices had an EHR in 2005 whereas only 3.5 percent of solo practices had an EHR. 
Obviously the financial risk for EHR adoption is significantly higher for a solo 
practitioner. However, little to no research exists that demonstrates if  an EHR’s 
expected return on investment (ROI)  holds across varying practice sizes (Menachemi & 
Brooks, 2006). Therefore solo practitioners have scant evidence to push them beyond the 
initial sticker shock. Another example by Pizzi and colleagues (2005) found that EHR 
users were more likely to be generalists, to work in academic medical centers, and were 
slightly younger. However, we have no evidence that EHRs are more beneficial for 
providers with these characteristics than for providers without (Menachemi & Brooks, 
2006). It appears then that EHR adoption is being driven less by a strong evidence base 
of the technology’s true impact and more by financial trepidation (Do we want to invest 
that much?), structural considerations (Are we the ‘type’ of organization to adopt an 
EHR?), and social norms (Won’t our providers reject an EHR?). 
So how will second generation EHR researchers grow the evidence base with 
more generalizable and actionable knowledge? We contend that they can do so now by 
transitioning their focus away from EHR pioneer organizations and focus instead on 
EHR early adopters—in our case, the organizations that adopted the technology in 
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anticipation of or response to the HITECH Act of 2009. We argue that these 
organizations are more similar in their composition and local environments to current 
EHR have-nots. This notion is supported by innovation research that posits “early 
adopters are a more integrated part of the local social system than the innovators" 
(Rogers, 2010, p. 309). By focusing on early adopters, EHR researchers will be 
conducting evaluations on organizations that are only a few steps removed from the 
‘everyman’ organizations that still lack the technology. Of course, this second 
expectation must not trump the requirements of our first research issue: targeted early 
adopters must still possess robust longitudinal datasets to protect against the threats to 
internal validity we discussed earlier. However, should both of these criteria be fulfilled 
we would expect the results from such research to be both statistically stronger and more 
actionable for the majority of healthcare organizations that continue to operate without 
comprehensive EHRs. 
  
Measuring the Financial Impact of EHRs: A Second Generation Approach 
 As we discussed at the outset, researchers continue to produce mixed results in 
regards to an EHR’s impact on productivity and quality. However, there appears to be 
less disagreement about the financial impact of EHRs. From a conceptual level, EHRs 
are expected to increase revenue through enhanced charge capture (Menachemi & 
Brooks, 2006). This is made possible by the EHR’s ability to more accurately prompt 
and document care (Häyrinen, Saranto, & Nykänen, 2008). This capability applies to 
pre-service (e.g. prompting providers to schedule appointments with overdue patients), 
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point-of-service (e.g. alerting providers of non-Medicare-covered procedures), and post-
service (e.g. allowing providers and patients to manage prescription refills). We could 
find no publications in MEDLINE (PubMed) that argued against this notion at a 
conceptual level. 
At the applied level, very little research exists that demonstrates the actual 
financial gains related to EHR implementation and most of the studies pertain to 
hospitals versus ambulatory care. The literature that does exist often bears the marks of 
first generation EHR research—that is, it either suffers from too few post-intervention 
data points or the study relates to an EHR pioneer organization. For example, in their 
review of 256 health information technology articles, Shekelle and colleagues (2006) 
found only nine articles that quantitatively assessed the economic value of 
comprehensive EHR use. Only two of those nine articles investigated variables related to 
charge capture, with the remaining seven selecting other indirect ‘benefit’ variables such 
as savings from chart pulling, reduced pharmacy costs, and prevention of adverse drug 
events.  Notably, both of these two studies used historically progressive, technology-
oriented healthcare organization—Partners HealthCare System (Wang et al., 2003) and 
Virginia Mason Medical Center (Schmitt & Wofford, 2002)—as their data sources, 
thereby strengthening our argument for a second generation approach to this same 
research question. In the ambulatory setting, only a few studies exist that address EHR 
implementation and financial measures and each have produced somewhat mixed 
results. MGMA’s national study (Gans, 2010) revealed increased revenue whereas a 
study of Cornell Weill’s implementation produced a neutral impact on billing (Grieger, 
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Cohen, & Krusch, 2007). We should note however that both of these studies involved 
practitioners who had implemented an EHR prior to 2009, thus not meeting our 
definition of second generation EHR research. A more recent study that does meet the 
definition of second generation EHR research revealed negative impacts on revenue in 
the short term (Fleming et al., 2014). 
In the following section we conduct a financial impact study but with an 
approach that meets both criteria of second generation EHR research. In responding to 
EHR Research Issue #1, our study includes 24 pre-intervention observation months and 
35 post-intervention observation months. This allows for ample post-intervention 
observation to strengthen our case against the aforementioned threats to internal validity. 
In responding to EHR research Issue #2, our study is conducted on an organization that 
implemented an enterprise EHR (Epic Systems (Verona, Wisconsin)) in the fall of 2010 
in response to the HITECH Act’s 2011 incentive requirement. Lending further 
credibility to this organization, they were transitioning from a paper-based health record 
system to an EHR—yet another similarity with current EHR have-nots. 
  
Methods 
Sample, Data, and Measures 
 We analyzed financial panel data from a large, metropolitan integrated pediatric 
primary care (PPC) network comprised of 372 providers across 42 practices. This PPC 
network implemented EPIC electronic health record system in the fall of 2010. Monthly 
encounter, charge, and collection data were collected from October of 2008 through 
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September of 2013 for each provider. This range provided us with approximately two 
years of pre-implementation data and three years of post-implementation data. Our data 
included monthly productivity measures at the physician level. Average monthly 
encounters, charges, and collections for the network’s physicians were 477, $89,174, and 
$64,217 respectively. We gathered data from the network’s billing and practice 
management software, which had been implemented in the fall of 2008—allowing us to 
obtain this financial data prior to the EHR’s implementation.  
 
Charge Capture 
 As mentioned earlier, the measure of charge capture has been used before in 
EHR economic evaluations, albeit in the context of first generation EHR research 
(Schmitt & Wofford, 2002; Shekelle et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2003). Charge capture is 
commonly described as ability to properly ensure that billable services are recorded and 
reported for payment. Improving charge capture ties back to the notion that physicians 
can offer a wide array of services during a patient visit but are only paid for those 
services that are both properly documented and deemed appropriate by third party 
payers. Conceptually, EHRs ought to improve charge capture through automation and 
enhanced coding capability. We measured charge capture by using the monthly ratio of 
charges-to-collections at the provider level. Using three provider-level variables 
available to us via the organization’s practice management system derived this ratio: 
monthly encounters, charges, and collections (lagged so that collections were 
apportioned back to the month of the originating charge). Using these three variables, we 
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calculated a monthly average per-patient charge, collection, and charge-to-collection 
ratio for each physician. All three variables appeared to be normally distributed (see 
Figure 1). Therefore, for ease of interpretation we used untransformed versions. We 
performed separate analyses for each of our three dependent variables. 
 
EHR 
 To capture the presence of EHR, a binary variable was created where all pre-
implementation observation months were coded ‘0’ and all post-implementation 
observation months coded ‘1’. Network administrators had divided all of the practices 
into four implementation groups. The four implementation ‘go-live’ dates included one 
in August, two in September, and one in November of 2010.  
 
Payer Mix 
We classified providers into four groups according to their average annual payer 
mix. Theoretically this classification should increase intra-group homogeneity as payer 
mix is highly correlated with the types of patients seen by a physician (Glied & Zivin, 
2002). Specifically, we calculated a bi-modal public-to-private-pay ratio (PPPR) for 
annual charges for each provider. The “public pay” portion of the figure combined 
Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and Medicare. After calculating 
this ratio for providers, we examined them for any natural break points that would allow 
for a meaningful classification without creating a subset with too few providers. The 
final sorting called for four groups: 
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1) Providers with a PPPR of less than 10 percent (n=26) 
2) Providers with a PPPR between 10 and 25 percent (n=14) 
3) Providers with PPPR between 25 and 100 percent (n=9) 
4) Providers with a PPPR in excess of 100 percent (n=8). 
 
Year 
 We added a control variable for calendar year in an attempt to control for any 
macro-level shifts in the environment such as changes in Medicaid reimbursement, 
implications related to the Affordable Care Act, and inflation.  
 
Analysis 
The dataset was initially examined for missing and anomaly values (e.g. average 
monthly per patient collection of $1,215). Providers with missing observations or 
months with fewer than ten patient encounters were subsequently dropped from 
consideration. Providers who were not employed prior to the EHR implementation were 
also dropped. These two inclusion requirements allowed us to avoid using any 
imputation. Locum providers were dropped due to low encounters and a high variance of 
payer mix across years. A total of 57 providers across 32 practices met all of the 
inclusion requirements.  
We estimated the following two-level fixed effects model: 
 
Yit  =  β1*EHR-Usej(i,t)i  + β2*PayerMixGroupi  +  β3*Year j(i,t)i  +  ψj(i,t)  +  αi  +  uit 
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where index j(i,t) denotes the practice of physician i during time t, Yit is the dependent 
variable (average monthly per patient charges by physician in model one, average 
monthly per patient collections by physician in model two, and average monthly per 
patient charge-to-collection ratio by physician in model three) for physician i in month t 
as a function of the time-varying practice-level variable EHR implementation, EHR-
Usej(i,t)i, the time-invariant physician payer mix group, PayerMixGroupi. We also 
included a time-varying practice-level year indicator, Year j(i,t)i in addition to a separate 
mean for each practice, ψj(i,t), a fixed effects at the physician level αi to control for 
practice-specific, time-invariant factors that might affect our three separately run 
dependent variables, and finally a mean zero error term uit (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Mihaly, & Sass, 
2010). 
By selecting a fixed effects model we argue that our errors are correlated with the 
regressors; that is, we assume that something within the physician, their practice, or their 
payer mix group may bias the predictor variables, the outcome variable, or both. We also 
assume that these time-invariant characteristics are unique to the physician and that each 
practice’s error term and constant (aggregates from individual physician characteristics) 
are not correlated with one another (Stock & Watson, 2012). A Hausman test was run to 
test correlation between the regressor and error terms using a random effects model and 
was rejected (p<0.001). We also verified that our fixed effects model was consistent 
(that is, xit and αi are correlated, but pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) was not 
(p<0.001)).  
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In addition to meeting the assumptions for fixed effects modelling stated above, 
we would like to further highlight some of the additional merits of this approach. When 
EHR researchers use traditional OLS regression, they would select a dependent variable 
similar to ours, a key predictor variable such as “EHR use”, and a slew of other available 
control variables. However, this approach is susceptible to omitted variable bias. A 
number of important variables exist in EHR research but are difficult to obtain and to 
measure reliably. For example, a providers’ attitude toward technology has been shown 
to vary significantly yet heavily influence behavior (Morton & Wiedenbeck, 2010). 
Similar variance has been found among physicians and their perceived computer literacy 
and disruption in workflow (Menachemi, 2006). However, these types of variables can 
only be collected through primary data collection, which typically suffers from a low 
response rate (both of the previous two studies had a response rate below 30 percent) and 
dramatically increase the cost of the study. As a result, these variables are rarely 
included in studies such as this one that rely on secondary EHR and practice 
management data. We argue that these variables are correlated with physician 
productivity (which is a function of charges and, subsequently, collections) and EHR 
use. If this is the case then the coefficient on EHR use will be biased. Fortunately, fixed 
effects modelling controls for both observable and unobservable differences among 
physicians and practices, thereby reducing the threat of omitted variable bias (Stock & 
Watson, 2012). 
Finally, fixed effects modelling presented a good fit with our dataset. Propensity 
score matching was not permissible since all physicians within the network received the 
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EHR “dose” within a 45-day window. ARIMA modeling was not possible due to too few 
pre-intervention data points (McCleary & Hay, 1980). 
To compare how our three DVs changed over time, we calculated mean values at 
selected annual intervals across our four payer mix groups. Differences in mean values 
between our first and last observation months were analyzed with t tests for a broad 
illustration of the direction of the data. We also graphically traced the evolution of our 
three DVs across the four payer mix groups. Our fixed effects regression models are 
presented as a series of nested models (Macinko, Guanais, & de Souza, 2006). Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) was used to improve model selection. 
 
Results 
 Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for mean provider monthly encounters 
as well as mean per patient charges, collections, and charge-to-collection ratio grouped 
across our four categories of payer mix. We also present monthly means graphically in 
Figures 8-11. Encounters and charge-to-collection ratios fluctuate across all six years 
and exhibit seasonal trends—most notably with high points during the ‘back-to-school 
season’ and low points during the summer. Recall that these figures are normalized by 
patient encounters, which is implies more procedures, more expensive procedures, or a 
combination of both are driving the seasonal trends. General trends of increased charges, 
increased collections, and decreased charge-to-collection ratios appear to exist, but 
become more clearly defined with providers who see more public pay patients (see 
Figures 9-11). Significant increases in per patient charges and per patient collections 
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from 2008 to 2013 were found for three of the four payer mix categories. Only 
physicians in the highest public-to-private pay ratio category exhibited significant 
improvements in their charge-to-collection ratio (that is, a decrease in the ratio implies 
the physician is collecting on a higher percentage of submitted charges). 
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Table 8: Summary statistics for 57 providers by payer mix group (selected intervals 
08/08 – 09/13) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *(p<0.05); **(p<0.01). 
 
Payer Mix Group
Mean Provider 
Monthly 
Encounters
Mean Per Patient 
Monthly Charges 
($)
Mean Per Patient 
Monthly 
Collections ($)
Mean Per Patient 
Monthly Charge-
to-Collection 
Ratio
Pub/Priv Ratio <10% (n=26)
Oct 2008 476 198.60 150.49 1.34
Oct 2009 583 197.02 161.22 1.23
Oct 2010 466 207.42 145.78 1.47
Oct 2011 478 205.57 148.29 1.45
Oct 2012 437 205.36 155.85 1.75
Sep 2013 393 232.44 180.74 1.39
Change 08/08-09/13 -83.58 (42.82) 33.84 (26.99) 30.25 (24.56) .0462 (.0796)
Pub/Priv Ratio 10-25% (n=14)
Oct 2008 494 191.85 131.02 1.58
Oct 2009 607 182.15 144.30 1.27
Oct 2010 495 190.49 136.84 1.45
Oct 2011 468 196.21 141.22 1.55
Oct 2012 516 205.46 155.77 1.55
Sep 2013 436 219.54 170.71 1.34
Change 08/08-09/13 -57.64 (54.15) 27.68 (10.09)** 39.69 (14.90)** -.2455 (.1603)
Pub/Priv Ratio 25-100% (n=9)
Oct 2008 379 170.99 119.88 1.42
Oct 2009 469 170.35 137.13 1.29
Oct 2010 388 192.48 140.40 1.47
Oct 2011 400 188.83 133.49 1.53
Oct 2012 556 200.80 165.68 1.26
Sep 2013 481 217.79 185.95 1.24
Change 08/08-09/13 101.44 (66.68) 46.80 (13.80)** 66.06 (18.92)** -.1802 (.1076)
Pub/Priv Ratio >100% (n=8)
Oct 2008 400 141.87 65.49 2.42
Oct 2009 465 142.33 79.21 1.90
Oct 2010 429 177.27 119.13 1.60
Oct 2011 481 186.43 123.88 1.59
Oct 2012 490 199.51 139.72 1.58
Sep 2013 409 223.70 170.60 1.47
Change 08/08-09/13 8.14 (132.05) 81.83 (30.97)* 105.11 (32.88)** -.9512 (.3638)*
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Tables 9-11 present the results of the two-level fixed effects modelling for all 
three dependent variables. Model 1 presents the simple bivariate relationship between 
the DV and the implementation of the EHR. The introduction of the EHR is associated 
with a significant increase in charges and collections. EHR does not appear to have a 
significant impact on charge-to-collection ratio. Model 2 introduces our payer mix 
categories and only slightly alters the impact of EHR compared to Model 1, but 
improves our R2 and provides a smaller AIC indicating a stronger model. The results for 
the payer mix categories can be interpreted as follows: ceteris paribus, as providers see a 
higher percentage of public pay patients, their mean charges and collections decrease 
and their charge-to-collection ratios increase. Finally, Model 3 introduces our calendar 
year control variable and significantly alters the impact of EHR on our DVs compared to 
Models 1 and 2, while also improving our R2, decreasing AIC and decreasing the 
standard error for all other IVs.  
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Figure 8: Mean encounters over time by payer mix group 
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Figure 9: Mean per patient charges over time by payer mix group 
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Figure 10: Mean per patient collections over time by payer mix group 
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Figure 11: Mean charges-to-collections ratio over time by payer mix 
group 
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Table 9: Fixed effects model output for EHR impact on per patient charges 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Month & practice fixed effects not shown. 
*(p<0.05); ** (p<0.01). 
 
 
  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EHR 27.05** (1.58) 27.05** (1.57) 11.09** (2.49)
Payer Mix Group
Pub/Priv Ratio <10% - Ref Ref
Pub/Priv Ratio 10-25% - -4.21 (3.83) -4.21 (3.77)
Pub/Priv Ratio 25-100% - -20.92** (5.97) -20.92** (5.88)
Pub/Priv Ratio >100% - -58.93** (8.51) -58.93** (8.37)
Year
2008 - - Ref
2009 - - -0.83 (3.25)
2010 - - 3.52 (3.30)
2011 - - 14.48** (3.75)
2012 - - 14.84** (3.75)
2013 - - 27.84** (3.84)
Constant 175.78** (0.97) 187.56** (2.73) 184.30** (3.85)
Observations 3360 3360 3360
Number of Practices 32 32 32
R2 (within) 0.0811 0.0958 0.1254
AIC 34057.33 34009.29 33907.21
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Table 10: Fixed effects model output for EHR impact on per patient collections 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Month & practice fixed effects not shown. 
*(p<0.05); **(p<0.01). 
 
 
 
  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EHR 18.91** (1.71) 18.91** (1.70) 11.49** (2.72)
Payer Mix Group
Pub/Priv Ratio <10% - Ref Ref
Pub/Priv Ratio 10-25% - -1.45 (4.15) -1.45 (4.13)
Pub/Priv Ratio 25-100% - -16.60** (6.47) -16.60** (6.44)
Pub/Priv Ratio >100% - -64.69** (9.22) -64.69** (9.17)
Year
2008 - - Ref
2009 - - 4.31 (3.56)
2010 - - 6.32 (3.62)
2011 - - 9.06* (4.11)
2012 - - 10.27* (4.11)
2013 - - 20.12** (4.21)
Constant 127.95** (1.07) 139.07** (2.96) 133.46** (4.21)
Observations 3360 3360 3360
Number of Practices 32 32 32
R2 (within) 0.0354 0.0533 0.0639
AIC 34604.78 34547.57 34520.01
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Table 11: Fixed effects model output for EHR impact on per patient charge-to-
collection ratio 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Month & practice fixed effects not shown. *(p<0.05); 
**(p<0.01). 
 
Discussion 
This study suggests that the introduction of an EMR to a pediatric care network 
is independently associated with an $11.09 increase in average per patient charges, an 
$11.49 increase in average per patient collections, and an improvement in physicians 
charge-to-collection ratio, controlling for other variables. These findings align with the 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EHR .0009 (.0167) .0009 (.0167) -.0776** (.027)
Payer Mix Group
Pub/Priv Ratio <10% - Ref Ref
Pub/Priv Ratio 10-25% - -.0143 (.0408) -.0143 (.0407)
Pub/Priv Ratio 25-100% - .0383 (.0636) .0383 (.0634)
Pub/Priv Ratio >100% - .3102** (.0906) .3102** (.0903)
Year
2008 - - Ref
2009 - - -.0820* (.0351)
2010 - - -.0731* (.0356)
2011 - - .0252 (.0404)
2012 - - .0353 (.0404)
2013 - - -.0092 (.0414)
Constant 1.464** (.010) 1.422** (.0291) 1.478** (.0414)
Observations 3360 3360 3360
Number of Practices 32 32 32
R2 (within) 0.0015 0.0057 0.0135
AIC 3496.541 3483.339 3466.831
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conceptual expectations set forth by early EHR advocates (Häyrinen et al., 2008; 
Menachemi & Brooks, 2006) and add an additional financial measurement factor for 
earlier empirical studies that relied on projected “costs averted” as the revenue-related 
benefit of the EHR (Schmitt & Wofford, 2002; Wang et al., 2003). We believe this is the 
first study of its kind to evaluate the impact of EHR on charge capture in a fee-for-
service model. Almost all previous, similar studies we could find had been conducted on 
EHR pioneer organizations and networks. Unlike those HIT-advanced organizations, our 
study was conducted on an organization that, prior to the HITECH Act and as recent as 
2010, was a paper-based organization. As a result, we believe our findings are more 
generalizable to the remaining EHR have-nots who are still paper-based. 
Our finding of significant relationships between EHR implementations and 
charges, collections, and charge-to-collection ratios is informative for both researchers 
and practitioners. Our findings suggest that despite the varying starting points (intercepts 
in our model) of different payer mix affiliations, EHRs benefit all physician types. It 
does appear, though, that physicians who principally serve public pay patients stand to 
benefit more given their lower pre-implementation means. This was illustrated through 
our non-estimation based t tests and visual scanning of our longitudinal data (Figures 8-
11). It also appears that the EHR acted as a leveling mechanism across the organization, 
creating greater parity for charges, collections, and charge-to-collection ratios across 
payer mix groups. 
This study generates a few very important questions. First: Are EHRs enabling 
providers to deliver higher quality, in-office care that is resulting in the $11 increase in 
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charges? Or, is the EHR merely improving providers’ charting processes that 
subsequently allow their organizations to increase charges by $11? This is a valuable 
question but with an expensive answer. The simplest option would be to examine patient 
records by physician to see if the quantity or appropriateness of procedures improved 
after the EHR implementation. Unfortunately, since this was a paper-based organization 
this would require a very resource-intense data capture effort. Second: If EHRs really are 
just improving charting and not producing higher quality, in-office care, is $11 per 
patient encounter a fair price for the potential downstream benefits of having the EHR 
(e.g., reduced adverse drug events, improved coordination as a child transitions to adult 
care, convenience in prescription refills, etc.)? Finally: How different would these results 
have been in a capitated environment? If physicians are not operating under fee-for-
service parameters, perhaps they would be less likely to utilize an EHRs capacity to 
prompt and warn? Perhaps in answering this second question we could also answer the 
first question posed in this paragraph. 
 Fortunately, some research is already beginning to investigate these issues. On 
the adverse side, there are emerging cases of practices purposively abusing an EHR’s 
capacity to upcode. Verges (2012) estimated that upcoding may have cost Medicare 
$100 million in 2010. On the positive side, Zhang and colleagues (2013) ruled out that 
‘copy-paste’ charting was associated with inflated charges. As we have stated above, 
more research is warranted to better understand the implications of EHRs and how 
providers and administrators respond to the technology. 
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Limitations 
 Although our results align with previous research and also demonstrate strong 
face validity among the pediatric network administrators, there are a few limitations 
worth mentioning. First, given the nature of the data set, we have very few variables to 
hold constant, therefore increasing our likelihood for omitted variable bias. Indeed, our 
low R2 values in all three models suggest we are not doing the best at explaining the 
variation in our dependent variables. Second, although we attempted to incorporate a 
proxy regressor—calendar year—to account for external shocks to the system, our 
model does not incorporate more granular, contextual trends of less than 12 months that 
might confound charges, collections, or charge-to-collection ratios (e.g. employment 
trends, trends unique to the networks MSA, etc.). Finally, as our data set was from a 
single organization, albeit an early adopter and by no means an EHR pioneer, our 
findings cannot be generalized to all pediatric care networks nor to other non-pediatric 
healthcare organizations. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: APPLICATION OF THE SECOND ORDER IMPACTS OF 
INNOVATION RESEARCH MODEL 
 
Introduction 
 In this final chapter we will explore the implications of each of the three 
preceding chapter’s results in light of our second order impact (SOI) research model (see 
Figure 12 below for a recap of the SOI conceptual model). In doing so, we aim to 
highlight how these three studies both elaborate and support our conceptual model. We 
will also address how these three particular innovations fit within the industry’s general 
need for transformation. Finally, we will conclude with a broader discussion of how SOI 
and, thus, our model are relevant not only to individuals inside of the organization, but 
also to stakeholders outside the organization. 
 
! ! !
99 !
 
Figure 12: SOI in relation to innovation. Adapted from Baert (1991), Rogers (2010), 
and Sveiby et al. (2009) 
 
Paper 1: Cost-Effectiveness of Colorectal Cancer Screening 
Enabling primary care physicians (PCPs) to serve as trained endoscopists is a 
safe, sustainable method for improving patient access to colorectal cancer (CRC) 
screening. This first order relationship has been established by multiple studies 
(O'Malley et al., 2004; Roge et al., 1994; E. G. Stone, 2002; Wilkins et al., 2009). Our 
study examined the unintended impacts of CRC screening training in family medicine 
residency programs. Specifically, by examining the training program’s impact on cost 
and clinical effectiveness, we found that not only do CRC screening strategies remain 
below commonly accepted willingness-to-pay (WTP) thresholds, but that the relative 
rankings of the strategies was also disrupted. 
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With regards to our conceptual model, these results fall into the category of naïve 
windfall. The results are desirable and complementary for the original innovation—
enabling primary care physicians to perform CRC screening. These results demonstrate 
that the additional costs required to train PCPs do not push any of the CRC strategies 
above WTP thresholds. The innovation achieves this by improving patient adherence. 
The study demonstrated that as long as patient adherence can be improved from 55 
percent to at least 68 percent the innovation will produce a positive return on investment. 
This study’s findings are classified as naïve windfall and not envisaged windfall 
due to the complexity of the program costs. This evaluation was for a first-of-its kind 
overhaul for family medicine residency programs. As such, it is unlikely that anyone 
could have anticipated the total per resident cost that was calculated as a result of this 
study. Indeed, we (the research team) were unsure of the how the results would lean 
prior to conducting the analysis. At one point we were even wary of the funding 
agency’s reaction had the results reflected poorly on the residency program’s costs. 
Thus, we classify these findings as naïve windfall as they are desirable, but 
unanticipated. 
In regards to our vertical “E”vidence based management (EBM) axis, these 
findings further elevate the innovation as an empirically vetted policy. That is, we 
believe that our results further strengthen the case for enabling PCPs to perform CRC 
screening though family medicine residency training. We also believe that our study’s 
design further enhanced its generalizability. First, the clinical effectiveness data were 
derived from a meta-analysis of clinical trials data. Second, though our cost data were 
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derived from a single test site, the process behind the capital acquisition required that we 
obtain nationwide vendor quotes, thus improving the likelihood that these costs could be 
replicated at other family medicine residency programs. When combined with the 
previously mentioned first order impacts (FOI) studies (which demonstrated PCP’s 
ability to perform safe, efficient in-office CRC screening) this policy is one step further 
along on its journey to what Rousseau (2006) would refer to as “Big ‘E’ Evidence.”  
Finally, in regards to our horizontal adoption/diffusion axis, we believe these 
findings will exhibit an intermediate affect power. That is, this SOI will support the 
innovation in its continued adoption and diffusion, but at neither a high nor a low degree 
of impact. Recall that in Chapter 1 we argued that second order impacts with high 
observability and low latency possess more power to affect the innovation’s diffusion. 
We contend that our study’s desirable results will ultimately be critical for decision-
makers who might otherwise balk at the initial high cost of the innovation, thus 
supporting its diffusion. However, because the impact of the innovation (an increase in 
patient adherence and a decrease in colorectal cancer) will not be realized for years or 
possibly even a decade, this study suffers from high latency. As a result, we expect these 
findings to exhibit an intermediate affect power on the innovation’s continued diffusion. 
 
Paper 2: Organization Tenure and Nurses’ Perceptions of Change Initiatives 
System-level cultural change initiatives such as Studer Group’s ‘Evidence Based 
Leadership’ (EBL) are being widely adopted by acute care hospitals in an effort to 
improve patient satisfaction scores and organizational accountability. Though little 
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research has been conducted on EBL as a whole (Vest & Gamm, 2009), studies have 
been conducted that demonstrate the desirable, intended FOI of AIDET (L.-f. Zhang et 
al., 2013), hourly rounding (Christine M Meade, Amy L Bursell, & Lyn Ketelsen, 2006), 
and discharge phone calls (Kennedy, Craig, Wetsel, Reimels, & Wright, 2013; Setia & 
Meade, 2009). Our study examined the unintended impacts of these three change 
initiatives on the nurses responsible for implementing them. Specifically, by examining 
how long a nurse had worked for the organization and his/her perceptions of the three 
initiatives, we found that in some, but not all cases, significant differences in perceptions 
do exist depending on how long one has been in an organization. Our results indicate the 
mechanics and disruptiveness of each individual intervention moderates a nurse’s 
perceptions. 
These mixed results provide a unique opportunity to demonstrate the breadth and 
versatility of our SOI model. Within the context of this study, we can categorize the 
results across tenure strata and for each of the three change initiatives. So, whereas in 
Study 1 where the results could be neatly placed into a single category of SOI, results 
from Study 2 will fall into multiple categories depending on the perspective taken and 
the specific results for each change initiative.  
 For example with regards to discharge phone calls (DPC), the non-significant 
differences across categories of tenure, taken in tandem with overall favorability, 
produce a SOI that we would classify as naïve windfall. These results are desirable for 
the innovation in that they complement the innovation’s intended impact. That is, not 
only can discharge phone calls improve patient satisfaction scores and patient quality of 
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care (Kennedy et al., 2013; Setia & Meade, 2009), it also appears to be an intervention 
that is well-received by the nurses who adopt the innovation, irrespective of organization 
tenure. We classify this as naïve versus envisaged as it contrasts with earlier literature 
that found positive relationships between nurse tenure and safety related change 
initiatives (McGovern et al., 2000; Nichol et al., 2008). In regards to our vertical EBM 
axis, these results further elevate DPC as being an empirically vetted innovation, but 
only marginally. Given the nature of the data—cross sectional from a single health 
system—we cannot infer strong generalizability, thus preventing any significant leaps on 
our vertical EBM axis. In regards to our horizontal adoption/diffusion axis, we believe 
these findings will further support DPC in its continued adoption and diffusion. 
 Meanwhile, when we consider the results for AIDET and hourly rounding 
(though less so for the latter), we find ourselves in an undesirable category of our model: 
counter-finality. Specifically, the results here indicate that the more senior a nurse is, the 
less favorably he/she perceives these two innovations. These results contrast and could 
possibly even counteract the two innovations’ desirable, intended first order impacts 
(Christine M Meade et al., 2006; L.-f. Zhang et al., 2013). We know from the literature 
that senior nurses are better positioned to serve as ‘change champions’ as they possess 
more sway over their junior counterparts in sustaining a change intervention (Scalzi, 
Evans, Barstow, & Hostvedt, 2006). Thus, we could expect the innovation to diffuse 
more slowly or eventually fail all together, despite the high favorability among novice 
nurses. 
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We classify this as anticipated versus unanticipated, though accurate 
classification would depend on the knowledge of the change agent. As we discussed in 
the introduction section of Study 2, the literature has produced mixed results with both 
positive and negative relationships between organization tenure and change initiative 
favorability. If the change agent had expected more senior nurses to be more hostile to 
the innovation, this would be a case of counter-finality. Conversely, if the change agent 
had expected more senior nurses to be less hostile to the innovation, this would be a case 
of sub-optimality. 
With regard to our vertical EBM axis, while these results do not necessarily 
negate any previous desirable relationships between the innovation and a first order 
outcome variable, they do call into question the long-term sustainability of these two 
innovations. Should one or both of the innovations fail to “stick” in the organization, 
they would meet the criteria of having performed as a “little ‘e’” evidence based practice 
that failed in spite of its desirable FOI. 
Finally, in regards to our horizontal adoption/diffusion axis, we believe these 
less-than-ideal findings will slow, if not halt AIDET and hourly rounding in their 
continued adoption and diffusion. Which impact ultimately ‘wins’ is likely a function of 
subsequent events. As we alluded to earlier, the ability of a SOI to affect an innovation’s 
long-term payoff is seldom clean or quick. Instead we should expect the two opposing 
levels of impact to interact in a metaphorical war of attrition. Each ‘side’ can be 
reinforced by action or inaction on the part of the change agent. For example, continued 
top-level and managerial support for the innovation (both financial and social) would 
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reinforce the desirable FOI, thus reducing the affect power of our undesirable second 
order impacts. However, abandoning the innovation or too quickly introducing yet 
another innovation would reinforce the undesirable second order impacts and increase 
their affect power. 
 
Paper 3: EHR Impact on Charge Capture 
 A high hope for electronic health record (EHR) adoption and diffusion in the US 
was to improve the quality of care (Menachemi & Brooks, 2006). Fortunately, FOI 
research has demonstrated positive (albeit weak) linkages between EHR use and 
improved process compliance (Bardhan & Thouin, 2013; Patterson et al., 2012; T. J. 
Spaulding & Raghu, 2013), improved patient satisfaction (Kazley et al., 2012) and 
reduction in medication errors (Radley et al., 2013). Our study examined the unintended 
impacts of EHR adoption on charge capture. Specifically, by estimating a fixed effects 
model of the impact of EHR implementation on charges, collections, and a charge-to-
collection ratio, we found the introduction of an EMR to a pediatric care network is 
independently associated with an $11.09 increase in average per patient charges, an 
$11.49 increase in average per patient collections, and an improvement in a physician’s 
charge-to-collection ratio, controlling for other variables. 
 With regards to our conceptual model, similar to Study 2, these results will fall 
into multiple categories depending on the perspective taken. From the perspective of the 
pediatric network, these results fall into the category of envisaged windfall. From this 
perspective, the results complement the original, intended first order impact of improved 
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quality care. We classify this as envisaged versus naïve windfall as there was an 
abundance of conceptual expectations set forth by early EHR advocates (Häyrinen et al., 
2008; Menachemi & Brooks, 2006) and with earlier empirical studies that relied on 
projected costs averted as the revenue-related benefit of the EHR (Schmitt & Wofford, 
2002; Wang et al., 2003). In regards to our vertical EBM axis, these results further 
elevate EHR as being an empirically vetted innovation. Given the nature of our study 
design (that is, second generation EHR research), we can infer improved generalizability 
compared to that of first generation EHR research that would have relied on EHR 
pioneers and organizations who were structurally and culturally different than most 
typical healthcare organizations. Our generalizability is further supported by the wide 
array of patient-payer mix present in our dataset. In regards to our horizontal 
adoption/diffusion axis, we believe these findings will strongly support EHR diffusion in 
the industry. 
 Meanwhile, when we consider the perspective of either society or payers, we find 
ourselves yet again in the undesirable category of SOI. As we mentioned above, that so 
much literature had predicted this likely outcome, we contend that this was a known 
likely outcome to national policy-makers who went ahead with the innovation 
regardless. Thus, from the societal perspective we would classify this as counter-finality. 
This pessimistic interpretation of the results projects that charges and collections are 
increasing, but with little evidence that those increases are resulting from a change in the 
type of care delivered. Instead, physicians could be delivering the exact same care they 
did prior to the EHR, only now with a much improved automated documentation 
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process. In this bleak outlook, only the organization is benefitting while society is simply 
paying $11.49 more per visit for the same level of care. 
Interestingly, despite this negative SOI for society we would expect 
organizations to continue to adopt EHRs (a dialectic tension we will discuss in the 
following section on public versus private consequence). This provides a keen example 
of our horizontal adoption/diffusion axis in action. Although the SOI in this particular 
case is undesirable for society, this study will do little to slow the diffusion of EHR use. 
 
Public Consequence vs. Private Consequence 
 Finally, we would be remiss to partake in such a lengthy discussion on 
innovation and its primary and second order impacts and not discuss whom ultimately 
benefits. Sociologists have argued that an innovation yields consequences of the public 
variety, private variety, and in many cases, both (Mazzarol, 2011; Wejnert, 2002). Public 
consequences are realized when an innovation’s chief recipient is a collective actor such 
as a country, region, or a subset of the population. The advent of the diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) classification system is an example of such an innovation. DRGs were 
enacted to shift hospitals away from the existing unrestrained cost reimbursement system 
(W. C. Hsiao, Sapolsky, Dunn, & Weiner, 1986). The consequences of this innovation 
were controlled costs for payers (both public and private) and a decrease in practice 
variance. These consequences were of immediate benefit to the public. 
 Private consequences on the other hand are realized when an innovation’s chief 
recipient is either an individual or a small collective such as an organization or a peer 
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group. Any innovation that is enacted with the goal of improving an organization’s 
market share or productivity is an example of an innovation with private consequence. 
The actor purposively protects such an innovation in an effort to protract their time 
before competitors can imitate the innovation and thereby remove the competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). 
 To be clear, both varieties of consequence can benefit society. Management 
scholars have argued that to truly maximize growth of the firm an organization must 
“develop new and innovative goods and services that generate economic growth while 
delivering important benefits to society” (Ahlstrom, 2010, p. 11). Pharmaceutical 
companies that invest billions into research and development are doing so principally to 
drive profits and appease stockholders. However, society benefits when drugs are 
developed that cure disease and improve quality of life. The same can be said for 
agriculture (How can we grow more food faster and cheaper?), transportation (How can 
we travel faster, safer, and more efficiently?) and energy (How can we produce cheaper, 
safer, sustainable energy?). In these non-dichotomous cases, Wejnert (2002) argues that 
innovations can “reflect direct (manifested function) and indirect (latent function) 
consequences.” Whereas FOI research focuses mostly on the manifested function, we 
contend that SOI research is critical in highlighting the latent functions. As a result, SOI 
research becomes not only relevant to the innovating organization (the private 
consequence) but also to stakeholders outside of the innovating organization (the public 
consequence). 
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For the innovating organization, SOI research can provide additional insight into 
the public consequences of the innovation. In the event the public consequences are 
desirable, the organization can exploit these findings to demonstrate the value of the 
innovation both internally (vision alignment) and externally (marketing and/or 
fulfillment of community need). Such is the case with Chapter 2. That colonoscopies 
performed by primary care physicians can actually improve the cost-effectiveness of the 
strategy while simultaneously improving patient accessibility is a finding that ought to 
be insightful and encouraging for primary care physicians who are contemplating the 
innovation. Primary care physicians could also exploit these findings as they market the 
new service line and lobby for additional support among third party payers. Conversely, 
in the event the public consequences be less than desirable, the organization can 
strategically posture itself to mitigate criticism. As discussed earlier, one could argue 
that results from Chapter 4 are neutral or even negative from a societal perspective. 
Critics could contend that EHRs are increasing healthcare costs at a time when 
healthcare innovations ought to be focusing on achieving the opposite. However, 
knowledge of this information (specifically that charges increased by $11.09 and 
collections increased by $11.49) can inform EHR-adopting organizations of the amount 
of additional cost savings they would need to demonstrate to counter critics’ arguments. 
For stakeholders outside of the innovating organization, SOI research can inform 
them where they ought to stand in regard to the organization-level innovation. Should 
the public consequences be desirable, collective entities such as the government, private 
payers, and patient advocacy groups ought to support the innovation’s diffusion 
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throughout the industry. Such is the case with the colonoscopy study from Chapter 2. 
Given the results the study, Medicare, Medicaid, and private health plans ought to 
incentivize additional family medicine residency programs to add colorectal cancer 
screening training. In the likely event that specialists such as gastroenterologists could 
view this innovation as professional encroachment by primary care physician, one can 
witness here an illustration recognized as “disruptive innovation” for CRC services and 
providers (Hwang & Christensen, 2008). Conversely, should the public consequences be 
undesirable as they were in Chapter 4, the collective entities ought to conduct counter-
operations to slow its diffusion or negate its impact. We witnessed such a reaction from 
public and private payers in 2012 when it was revealed that EHR-using organizations 
were dramatically increasing their reimbursements, due in part to more efficient billing 
documentation afforded by EHRs (Abelson, Creswell, & Palmer, 2012). The US 
Department of Health and Human Services and the US Department of Justice responded 
by issuing a warning letter about the illegality of encounter “cloning” and improper 
upcoding (Lowes, 2012). Similarly, private payers launched a series of targeted audits to 
“ensure that medical records do not contain inaccurate information that may indicate that 
the provider documented more work than he/she actually did or needed to do” 
(Independence Blue Cross, 2013, p. 1). 
 
Conclusion 
 In summary, we have highlighted how SOI research can augment its pervasive 
first order brethren by focusing on the latent functions of an innovation. Our SOI model 
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encourages both practitioners and researchers to observe the long game of an innovation 
instead of just the ‘low hanging fruit’ of FOI. Our model also calls attention to the dearth 
of research on the unintended, oftentimes undesirable impacts of innovation, commonly 
referred to as the research community’s “pro-innovation bias” (Sveiby et al., 2009). 
Avoiding the myopia of FOI-only research can help practitioners avoid many of the 
common pitfalls of innovation implementation that are pervasive across all industries. It 
can also help them identify opportunities for leveraging an innovation to spur additional 
growth and capacity for change.  
Whether the SOI produces results that are supportive of or contrary to the 
innovation’s FOI, we have argued that such research is immediately relevant to both the 
innovating organization and also to stakeholders outside the innovating organization. 
This concept feeds back into our horizontal adoption/diffusion axis from Chapter 1. 
Recall that we argued SOI research could either accelerate or slow an innovation’s 
adoption and diffusion. Through our proposals of internal marketing and increased 
public funding or our real-life examples of DHHS warning letters and directed audits we 
have provided concrete examples of how SOI research can affect an innovation’s rate of 
adoption and diffusion. We contend that with additional SOI research we are equipping 
decision makers with the decision support they need to pursue changes that will truly 
transform healthcare. 
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